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I. INTRODUCTION
In his Report on the Regulatory Agencies submitted to the
President-Elect on December 21, 1960, Dean James M. Landis
urged that agency heads be authorized to delegate functions to
subordinates so that they might concentrate upon program plan-
ning and policy formulation.' Dean Landis pointed out that cur-
rent workloads made it impractical to expect the heads of most
agencies to read the records of hearings, the briefs of counsel, or
even the findings of hearing examiners, let alone write their own
opinions He recommended a broad grant of powers to delegate
and, to this end, proposed:
(1) A revival of the President's power to submit reorganization
plans, which Congress had permitted to expire on June 1, 1959.'
(2) The exercise of this presidential power (a) to authorize the
ICC, CAB, FCC, FPC, NLRB, FTC, and SEC to delegate adjudi-
catory functions to panels of agency members, single agency mem-
bers, hearing examiners, or boards of employees, "subject only to
discretionary review by the agency en banc on petition by a
party in interest"4 and (b) to make clear, in the case of these
same agencies, "that the Chairman's authority extends to all
administrative matters within the agency, including responsi-
bility for the preparation and review of its budget estimates, the
distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs
and purposes, and the appointment of all personnel, except (i)
those whose appointment is by statute vested in the President,
(ii) division heads whose appointment must be confirmed by a
majority of the agency members, (iii) special assistants, not in
excess of three, to each of the members, which appointments shall
be made by the respective members." 5
(3) The creation of an Office for the Oversight of Regulatory
Agencies that would generally assist the President "in discharg-
ing his responsibility of assuring the efficient execution of those
1. LANDIS, 86TH Cox(;., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 85 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as LANDIS
REPORT].
2. Id. at 19-20. Data on current workloads of the principal regulatory
agencies are set forth in the congressional hearings and reports cited in note
61 infra.
3. Id. at 36-37, 84.
4. Id. at 85.
5. Ibid. Dean Landis also recommended that the reorganization plans
should assure that the chairmen of the ICC and FPC would serve at the
President's pleasure, as do the chairmen of the other named agencies. Id. at
84-85.
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laws that these agencies administer" and, in particular, "prepare
for the President detailed reorganization plans for the regulatory
agencies, with prime emphasis on the :EC, ICC, CAB, and FCC.:"
Under the Reorganization Act of 1949, a reorganization plan
submitted by the President could be disapproved only by a ma-
jority of the'authorized membership of either house of Congress.
A 1957 amendment permitted a simple majority of those present
in either house to disapprove a plan. Although Dean Landis sug-
gested that a reorganization plan should be subject to veto only
by concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress7 and the
Bureau of the Budget requested the restoration of the 1949 con-
stitutional majority requirement," a few months after President
Kennedy took office Congress extended the Reorganization Act
of 1949, as amended in 1957. The President was empowered to
submit reorganization plans until June 1, 1963Y
As soon as the Reorganization Act was extended, President
Kennedy informed Congress that he would transmit a series of
recommendations embodying the Landis proposals for intra-
agency delegation of authority. 0 Dean Landis, now a Special
Assistant -to the President, played a major role in the preparation
of the reorganization plans that were transmitted to Congress
in 1961.
6. Id. at 86-87. (Agencies abbreviated.)
7. Id. at 84.
8. See H. REP. No. 195, 871h Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1901). Dean Landis
also recommended that the power to propose reorganization plans should be
available to the President for a minimum of two, but preferably four, years.
L ANis-REPoRT 84. The Budget Bureau took the position that "the reorgan-
ization plan device should be permanently available to the President and the
Congress," but if not, that it should be made available for at least four-year
periods. H. lE. No. 195, op. cit. supra at 3. The Congress voted a two-year
extension.
9. 75 Stat. 41 (1961), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-3 (Supp. IV, 1962). The bill passed
the Senate on February 6, 1961, 107 CoNG. REc. 1753 (1961), and the House
on March 29, 1961, 107 CoNG. R c. 5273 (1961).
1O. Address 'by President Kennedy, Message to Congress, April 13, 1981,
printed in Hearings Before the Subcommittee of Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee o R Reorganizaton Plan No. 1 of 1961 (SEC), 87th Cong.,
l1t Sess. 37 (1961). The President stated that he would seek (1) to centralize
responsibility for the managerial functions of each regulatory agency in the
chairman; (2) to make the chairman responsible for the discharge of these
functions to the President, at whose pleasure he would serve; and (3) to au-
thorize "a far wider range of delegations to smaller panels of agency members,
or to agency employee boards, and to give their decisions and those of the
hearing examiners a considerable degree of finality [subject to] a discretionary
right of review of all such decisions, exercisable either upon its [the agency's]
own initiative or upon the petition of a party demonstrating to the agency
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:89.
This Article is concerned primarily with those aspects of the
reorganization plans that affect the role of the hearing examiner
in proceedings subject to the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Since the plans do not
purport to diminish any authority to delegate provided by the
APA, the Article also examines the extent to which the APA
authorizes agencies to accord administrative finality to the initial
decisions of hearing examiners. Finally, it should be remembered
that the statutes governing an agency also determine its authority
to accord finality to examiners' decisions. Such statutes may
grant broader, or if enacted after the APA narrower, authority
than that found in the APA. In the main, the Article does not deal
with these statutes.
II. AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE UNDER THE
REORGANIZATION PLANS OF 196111
A. PRovisioNs OF PLANs
Six reorganization plans, affecting the SEC, FCC, CAB, FTC,
NLRB, and Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), were sub-
mitted to Congress during 1961V2 The six plans conferred identi-
cal authority to delegate. For example, the first section of Plan
No. 3 for the CAB - the first to become effective - provides that
the CAB, in addition to its existent authority, shall have "the
authority to delegate . . .any of its functions to a division of
the Board, an individual Board member, a hearing examiner, or
an employee or employee board," but the grant of this authority
that the matter in issue is of such substantial importance that it calls for
determination at the highest agency level." Id. at 41, 42.
11. See generally Note, The Progress of Federal Agency Reorganization
Under the Kennedy Administration, 48 VA. L. Rav. 300 (1962).
12. Four other reorganization plans have been transmitted to Congress
to date, but they do not pertain to matters of present concern. Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 6, which fixes responsibility for the daily administration of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the chairman, became effective August
12, 1961. 75 Stat. 838 (1961), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (Supp. IV, 1002). Reor-
ganization Plan No. 1 of 1962, which provided for ithe establishment of a
Department of Urban Affairs and Housing, was disapproved by the House
of Representatives on Feb. 21, 1962. 108 CONG. REc. 2403-47 (daily ed.).
Plan No. 2 of 1962, which establishes the Office of Science and Technology
as a new unit within the Executive Office of the President and makes certain
changes in the National Science Foundation, became effective June 8, 1002.
76 Stat. 1253 (1962), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (Supp. IV, 1962). Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1963, which transfers the functions of the Secretary of the
Interior with respect to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library to the Adminis-
trator of General Services, became effective July 27, 1963. 28 Fed. Reg. 7069
(1963).
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is not to supersede the requirements of section 7(a) of the APA.
The Plan required the Board to retain "a discretionary right to
review the action" of its delegate "upon its own initiative or upon
petition of a party to or an intervenor in such actilon." A ma-
jority of the Board less one, however, may bring any delegated
action to the Board for review. In the absence of any review, the
delegated action is deemed to be the Board's action "for all pur-
poses, including appeal or review." The second section of the Plan
empowers the CAB chairman to assign Board personnel, including
Board members, to perform any functions that the Board may
delegate to such personnel or members.' 3
The plans for the SEC, FTC and FAIC were identical with the
plan for the CAB in every respect. The plan for the NLRB dif-
ferd from these plans only in that it did not seek to enlarge
the powers of the chairman. The plan for the FCC contained two
additional provisions. The first, designed to remove any possibility
of conflict between the plan and existing statutes, abolished "the
functions of the Commission with respect to the filing of excep-
tions to decisions of hearing examiners and the function of hearing
oral arguments on such exceptions before the entry of any final
decision, order or requirement as set forth in subsection (b) of
section 409 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended."'
The second additional provision abolished the FCC review staff
created by section 5(c) of the Communications Act of 1934.1
Nevertheless, only the plans for -the CAB, FTC, and FIVMC became
,effective; the plans affecting the SEC, FCC and NLRB were dis-
approved'
B. THE Pi s IN CONTEXT OF THE AD1%mI TRATiv
PRocEDuRE ACT
With specified exceptions that are not presently pertinent, sec-
13. 26 Fed. Reg. 5989 (1961).
14. 75 Stat. 422 (1961), 47 U.S.C. § 409(b) (Supp. IV, 1962).
15. 75 Stat. 40 (1961),.47 U.S.C. § 155(c) (Supp. IV, 1962).
16. Plan No. 1 of 1961 (SEC) was disapproved by the Senate by a vote
of 52 to 88 on June 21, 1961. 107 CONG. REC. 10995 (1961). Plan No. 2 of
1961 (FCC) was disapproved by the House on June 15, 1901. 107 CoNo. Rc.
10448 (1961). Plan No. 3 of 1961 (CAB) became effective July 3, 1961. 75
Stat. 837 (1961), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15 (Supp. IV, 1962). Plan No. 4 of 1961
(FTC) became effective July 9, 1961. 75 Stat. 837 (1961), 5 U.S.C. § 133z-15
(Supp. IV, 1962). Plan No. 5 of 1961 (NLRB) was disapproved by the House
on July 20, 1961. 107 CONG. ItEc. 13069 (1961). Plan No. 7 of 1961, which
concentrates responsibility for the performance of regulatory functions in a
newly created Federal Maritime Commission and for the performance of
promotional functions in the existing Maritime-Administration, became effec-
tive August 12, 1961. 75 Stat. 840 (1961), 5 U.S.C. § 13z-15 (Supp. IV, 1962).
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tions 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the APA,'17 taken together, prescribe the
following alternative courses of hearing and decision if the relevant
enabling statute requires an agency to make rules or adjudicate
cases "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing":' 8
(1) The agency may itself preside at the taking of the evidence
or it may delegate this task (a) to one or more agency members,
(b) to one or more examiners appointed pursuant to section 11
of the APA, 1' or (c) in "specified classes of proceedings," to
"boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated
pursuant to statute. '20
(2) If the agency itself presides at the hearing, the APA per-
mits it to dispense with any intermediate decision and decide the
case, with or without the prior submission by the parties of pro-
posed findings and conclusions, oral argument or written briefs.
Or the agency may issue a tentative or proposed decision and give
the parties an opportunity to file exceptions to it. In most cases,
of course, agency heads do not preside at hearings but delegate
this function.
(3) If the agency itself does not preside at the hearing and does
not, in a specific case or by general rule, require the entire record
to be certified to it for initial decision, the presiding officer must
decide the case initially. In cases not subject to the separation-of-
functions provisions of section 5(c) of the APA (i.e., rule making,
"determining... applications for initial licenses," and "proceed-
ings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or
practices of public utilities or carriers"21), any other officer quali-
fied to preside at hearings pursuant to section 7 may make the
17. 60 Stat. 238, 239, 241, 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1004, 1000, 1007
(1958).
18. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
19. 60 Stat. 244 (1946), as amended, 5 US.C. § 1010 (1958).
20. 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1958). The Attorney
General's Manual gives the following examples of the use of this alterna-
tive: (a) joint hearings before officers of federal agencies and persons desig-
nated -by one or more states, e.g., under the Interstate Commerce Act, 41
Stat. 484 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 13(3) (1958); (b) hearings before
joint state boards under the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 858 (1935), 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(h) (1958); (c) joint hearings before officers of more than one agency,
e.g., joint boards composed of members of the ICC and the CAB pursuant to
the Civil Aeronautics Act, 72 Stat. 791 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 643 (1958); (d)
hearings before quota review committees under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 63, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1863 (1958); and (c) hear-
ings -before boards of employees under the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat.
913 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 17(2),(1958). ATr'Y Gm., MA uAL ON TaI ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROcEDuRE ACT 72 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y Gnu. MLtNuAL].
21. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958).
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initial decision. The initial decision of the presiding officer (or
other officer authorized to make it) may become the final decision
of the agency, unless (a) a party appeals from the decision to the
agency Dr (b) the agency reviews the decision on its own motion.
On appeal from or review of the initial decisions, the agency has
"all the powers which it would have in making the initial deci-
sion," except as "it may limit the issues upon notice or by rule."
(4) If the agency itself does not preside at the hearing but
requires the record to be certified to it for initial decision, (a) the
officer presiding at the hearing (or other officer authorized to do
so) must recommend a decision, except that (b) in rule making or
determining applications for initial licenses, the agency may (i)
issue a tentative decision or any of its responsible officers may
recommend a decision in lieu of a recommended decision by the
presiding (or other qualified) officerf2 or (ii) dispense with any
intermediate decision "in any case in which the agency finds upon
the record that due and timely execution of its functions impera-
tively and unavoidably so requires."24 Neither the recommended
decision of the presiding officer or other responsible agency officer
nor the tentative decision of the agency can become the agency's
"flnar' decision, even in the absence of an appeal to or review by
the agency; it must be followed by an "initial" decision of the
agency which, in effect, is final.
By stating that they are not to be taken to supersede the pro-
visions of section 7(a) of the APA, the reorganization plans of
1961 prohibit the CAB, FTC, and FMC from delegating the
function of presiding over a section 7 hearing except as that sec-
tion permits. Clearly, the plans do not purport, thereby, to limit
the agency to the alternative courses of decision making available
to it under section 8. Thus, for example, the agency may delegate
the function of reviewing the initial decision of the hearing ex-
aminer to "an employee or employee board." Or, if it requires the
record to be certified to it for initial decision, it may delegate the
function of making the initial decision to "an employee or em-
ployee board.' At the same time, of course, the reorganization
22. 60 -Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1958).
23. The Attorney General's Manual explains that exception (b)(i) per-
inits the
continuation of the [then] widespread agency practice of serving upon
the parties, as a substitute for either an examiner's report or a tenta-
tive agency report, a report prepared by the staff of specialists and
teehnicians normally engaged in that portion of the agency's operations
to which the proceeding in question relates.
Arr'y GEN. MwuAx 82-8.
24. 60 Stat. 242(1946), 5 US.C. § 1007(a) (1958).
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plans may be used to accord a greater degree of administrative
finality to the initial decisions of the hearing examiners. In any
case, the agency must comply with the procedural requirements
of section 8(b) of the APA and the requirement of the reorganiza-
tion plan that it "retain a discretionary right to review the action
of" its delegate2 5
C. NATURE OF REVIEW OF INITIAL DEcIsIoNs AUTHORIZED
BY PLANS
1. Certiorari Review and Mandatory Review
In his Message on the regulatory agencies, President Kennedy
explained that a party asking the agency to exercise its discretion
to review the decision of its delegate would be required to demon-
strate to the agency that "the matter in issue is of such substantial
importance that it calls for determination at the highest agency
level." "A similar procedure - the petition for certiorari - suc-
ceeded in clearing up the overburdened docket of the Supreme
Court of the United States ... ,26
Rule 19(1) of the Supreme Court states that "review on writ
of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discre-
tion" and goes on to specify the factors that the Supreme Court
will consider in exercising its discretion to grant or deny certio-
rari.27 For present purposes, it is important to stress that these
factors do not bear on the merits of the particular case; rather,
they illustrate the "special and important reasons" that may
25. Plan No. 3 of 1961 (CAB), 75 Stat. 837, 5 US.C. § 138z-15 (Supp.
IV, 1962).
26. Address by President Kennedy, supra note 10, at 42.
27. U.S. SUP. CT. R. 19(1) provides:
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of soud
judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and
important reasons therefor. The lollowing, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance
not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has
decided an important state or territorial question in a way in conflict
with applicable state or territorial law; or has decided an important
question of federal law which -has not been, but should be, settled by
this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with
applicable decisions of this court; or -has so far departed from the ac-
cepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
court's power of supervision.
[Vol. 48:823
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justify review. Chief Justice Vinson elucidated these reasons in an
address before the American Bar Association, in which he empha-
sized that the Supreme Court is not, and never has been, "pri-
marily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court
decisions." Its function is "to resolve conflicts of opinion on
federal questions that have arisen among lower courts, to pass
upon questions of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power
over lower federal courts." "To remain effective," the Chief Justice
concluded, "the Supreme Court must continue to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolution will have
immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties
involved."' 8
In this Article, the term certiorari review will be used to de-
scribe a system under which the parties to a proceeding governed
by sections 7 and 8 of the APA do not have a right to agency re-
view of the hearing examiner's initial decision, in the sense that
agency action refusing review is not itself subject to judicial
review, and under which the exercise of the agency's discretion to
review depends on the general importance of the questions decided
by the hearing examiner and not the merits of his decision. By
contrast, the term mandatory review will be used to describe a
system under which the agency is obligated by statute to review
the merits of the initial decision at the request of a party adversely
affected by it, even if the questions decided by the hearing ex-
aminer have no importance "beyond the particular facts and
parties involved."
2. Apellate Review and De Novo Review
The term appellate review will be used to describe a system
under which the agency reviews the initial decision in the manner
that an appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court sitting
without a jury; the agency will uphold the hearing examiner's
findings of fact unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. - By
contrast, the term de novo review will be used to describe a system
under which the agency, in reviewing the initial decision, itself
determines which way the evidence preponderates. Mandatory
review may thus take the form of an appellate, or a de novo, re-
28. Address -by Chief Justice Vinson, American Bar Association, Sept. 7,
1949, -in 69 Sup. C. VI {1949).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), applicable to actions -tried upon the facts with-
out a jury, provides:
Findings of fact shal not be set eside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall -be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses....
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view. Once the agency decides to review under a system of certio-
rari review, it may afford an appellate, or a de novo, review.
3. Summary Review and Plenary Review
The term summary review will be used to describe a system
under which the agency requires the party seeking review of an
initial decision to make a preliminary showing that there are sub-
stantial substantive or procedural grounds to doubt its soundness.
By contrast, the term plenary review will be used to describe a
system under which the agency gives plenary consideration to any
exceptions taken to an initial decision without requiring a prelim-
inary showing that they are substantial.
Mandatory review may thus take a summary or plenary form;
and summary or plenary review may follow certiorari review, once
the agency decides to review. In turn, summary review may be
followed by further review of an appellate or de novo nature. If
further review is of an appellate nature, the party seeking review
will be required to make a preliminary showing that there are
substantial grounds for claiming that the hearing examiner's find-
ings or conclusions of fact are clearly erroneous. If further review
is de novo, the party must show that there are substantial grounds
for claiming that the evidence preponderates in its favor. In all
likelihood, however, an agency interested in according greater
administrative finality to the initial decisions of hearing examiners
will accompany summary review with appellate, rather than de
novo, review. It is also clear that summary review itself will im-
pose a greater burden upon agency members if they have to decide
whether a substantial, preliminary showing has been made that
the evidence preponderates the way the party claims rather than
that the hearing examiner's findings of fact are clearly wrong.
In either case, summary review is not comparable to denial of
a petition for certiorari by the Supreme Court; it is comparable
to the Court's dismissal of an appeal or affirmance of a judgment
for lack of a substantial federal question. 0 If the agency denies
It should -be noted that the term appellate review is not being used to de-
scribe a system under which the relationship -between hearing exarnincr and
agency would be like that between agency and reviewing court. (It is thus
assumed that the "clearly erroneous" standard gives the reviewing officials
broader authority to reverse the findings of fact of the hearing examiner than
would the "substantial evidence" standard.) It would be appropriate, of
course, to use the term to describe such a system also.
80. U.S. SUP. CT. Rs. 15()(e), (f) require the appellant from a state or
federal court to include in the jurisdictional statement "the reasons why the
questions presented are so substantial as to require plenary consideration,
with briefs on the merits and oral argument, for their resolution." U.S. Sup.
CT. R. 16(1)(b) authorizes the appellee to file a motion to dismiss an appeal
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further review because it is satisfied that the required preliminary
showing has not been made - and that, consequently, the filing of
further briefs on the merits, oral argument, and further agency
study of the record will serve only the purpose of delay-it will
affirm the initial decision summarily. Such action is not tanta-
mount to a refusal to adjudicate, but constitutes an adjudication
on the merits, albeit in summary form.
The reorganization plans authorize the use of any of the above
described systems of review of initial decisions, in any of the com-
binations indicated.
D. ACTION TAxE BY FMC, FTC ANm CAB UNDE PILAs
The authority granted by the reorganization plans for the
FMC, FTC, and CAB has not been exercised uniformly.
FMC. To date, the FMC has not used its authority at all; it
continues to use a mandatory, plenary, and de novo system of
review.3'
FTC. For two years, the FTC experimented with a set of rules
which, while not without ambiguity, did not seem to inaugurate
certiorari review but rather a mandatory, summary, and, depend-
ing upon the case, appellate or de novo system of review.32 As I
have reported elsewhere, the new system of review was never
given a chance to function because at least two of the commis-
sioners opposed the system in principle and exercised their right
under Reorganization Plan No. 4 to vote for plenary review in
every case! 3 In August, 1963, the full Commission amended its
rules to make them conform with the realities of its internal prac-
tice. So once again, any party to a proceeding may appeal any
initial decision to the Commission and secure a plenary, de novo
from the state court on the ground that "it does not present a substantial
federal question." U.S. Sup. CT. R. 16(1)(c) authorizes the appellee to file a
motion to affirm the judgment sought to be reviewed on appeal from a fed-
eral court on the ground that "it is manifest that the questions on which the
decision of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further
argument." For present purposes, the apt analogy is the appeal to the Su-
preme Court from a federal court.
31. See FMC Rules of Practice and Procedure, 46 CI.FR. §§ 201.224,220,
.228, .229, .l1 & .242 (1958). The FMC docket is not crowded and its need
to delegate is not as great as that of the other regulatory agencies.
32. See FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 10 C.FI.R.
§§ 4.1-O.2 (Supp. 1963). These rules were subsequently modified in minor
respects. It is significant that the new rules were issued and announced pub-
licly on July 6, 1961, before Reorganization Plan No. 4 became effective on
July 8, .1961.
33. See generally Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal
Organization and Procedure, 48 MwN. L. RPv. 383, 472-75 (1964).
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review of it by the Commission.8 4 So far as the FTC is concerned,
the struggle for the passage of the 1961 reorganization plans was
in vain.
CAB. Only the CAB rules, affecting both economic and air
safety proceedings governed by sections 7 and 8 of the APA, inau-
gurate certiorari review.85 The rules for economic proceedings state
that review of a hearing examiner's initial decision "is not a matter
of right but of the sound discretion of the Board." ' A petition for
discretionary review may be filed only upon one or more of the
following grounds:
(i) A finding of a material fact is erroneous;
<ii) A necessary legal conclusion is without governing precedent or
is a departure from or contrary to law, Board rules or precedent;
(iii) A substantial and important question of law, policy or discre-
tion is involved; or
(iv) A prejudicial procedural error -has occurred. 87
The Board "will exercise its right of review if it finds that the
public interest so requires, or when two or more Board members
vote in favor of such review." 88 Its order granting review will
then specify the issues to which review will be limited."
The Board explained that it was adopting a review procedure
34. FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 CF.R. §
3.22--.25 (Supp. 1963).
35. See CAB Delegation of Function to Hearing Examiners, 14 C.F.R. §
301.47 (1963). The rules for air safety proceedings are essentially the same
as those for economic proceedings and, for illustrative purposes, the text will
refer only to the latter. New Organizational Regulations were also issued to
provide a similar procedure for the discretionary review of delegated staff
action that does not have to be taken on the basis of an evidentiary record.
See 26 Fed. Reg. 12242 (1961). See generally Administrative Conference of
the United States (submitted -by Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure), Selected Reports
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th
Cong., let Sess. 405-08 (1963) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 24].
36. CAB Rules of Practice, 14 CYFR. § 302.28(a)(1) (1903).
87. Ibid. In air safety proceedings, the rules require the party seeking
,review to file a notice -of intent to petition for discretionary review before
the party actually petitions for review. 14 CY-R. §§ 302.45(a), (c) (1963).
Petitions for the discretionary review of staff action must make a reasonable
showing that one of the following grounds for review exists - (1) a finding of
material fact is clearly erroneous; (2) a legal conclusion is contrary to law,
Board rules, or precedent; (3) a substantial and important question of policy
is involved; (4) a prejudicial procedural error has occurred; or (5) the staff
action is substantially deficient on its face. 14 C.R. § 385.51(b) (1063).
Ground (5) is intended to include -such errors as the omission of necessary
findings or the failure to dispose of issues properly raised.
88. 14 C.F.R. § 302.28(d),(1963).
39. Ibid.
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"similar to the traditional practice of the United States Supreme
Court concerning petitions for writ of certiorari"40 Accordingly,
it rejected the suggestion that the Board "review its examiners'
judgments in any case having a significant impact upon the
parties thereto -without regard to whether the questions involved
are significant to the administration of the Federal Aviation
Act."4' Thus, the "major purpose" of the new rules is to substitute
certiorari review procedures for the present practice in which the
Board gives "de novo consideration to each and every issue which
any party may elect to raise by exception to an examiner's deci-
sion without regard to the substantiality or importance of such
issues.' The Board emphasized that it "remains free to decline
to exercise its right of review if it believes that review is not
required in the public interest," even where one or more of the
grounds for review enumerated above may be shown to be pres-
ent. 43 Yet, it remains to be seen whether the Board will actually
use the new rules to deny review of an initial decision for the sole
reason that the case does not have significant impact upon the
overall administration of the Federal Aviation Act.
In announcing the new rules, the CAB indicated that a peti-
tioner for review may "ask the Board to exercise its discretion by
reviewing issues which have an important economic impact upon
the petitioner although they are not necessarily significant in the
formation of Board policy. ' " It is reasonable to assume that such
a request will be granted; and not merely because two Board
members can be expected to call for review in such a case.
It is not likely that the Board will refuse to review any
case in which it becomes apparent that an error may have been
committed by the hearing examiner that could result in the re-
versal of the decision on judicial review, e.g., if a finding of ma-
terial fact is not supported by substantial evidence, or a necessary
legal conclusion is erroneous, or a procedural ruling is erroneous
and prejudicial. To refuse to review such a case because the ques-
tions decided by the examiner are not of general importance to
the administration of the statute will merely impose an unfair
burden on the persons adversely affected by the examiner's deci-
sion - and the courts - without relieving the agency. The agency
will have to deal with the case again on remand. This is the core
difficulty with certiorari review of initial decisions; the analogy
40. 27 Fed. Reg. 854 (1962).
41. Ibid.
4a. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. {Emp ass added.)
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with the petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari is
not apt. When the Supreme Court denies such a petition- for
whatever reason - the decision below becomes final. Not so with
an initial decision; once the agency refuses to review the initial
decision, it becomes the final agency decision, but it is still sub-
ject to judicial review.
Thus, if any of the grounds enumerated above are claimed to
exist in a petition for review, the Board may be expected to use
a summary review followed, if the petitioner's claim is that "a
finding of material fact is erroneous," by a de novo consideration
of the alleged error.45 As the Board itself emphasized, it retains
the power adequately to "protect the rights of parties to its pro-
ceedings against unsound decisions of an examiner .... "0
Certiorari review by the Board would seem to be appropriate
only if the exclusive ground for review relied on is that "a sub-
stantial and important question of . . . policy or discretion is
involved." In probably most of the cases in which initial decisions
are rendered in economic proceedings, questions of policy or dis-
cretion are involved, the administrative determination of which is
not likely to be upset by the reviewing court.47 Yet certiorari re-
view is of doubtful wisdom even in this category of cases, for the
following reasons advanced by the Administrative Conference's
Committee on Licenses and Authorizations:
The feeling among practitioners before the Board is that the delega-
tion is too broad and sweeping; that the kinds of policy choices involved
in major route cases should be made by the Board and not by the hear-
ing examiner, and that, to the extent that the Board reviews the merits
in passing on petitions for review, the new procedures are inappropriate
in that they impose narrow time and page limits upon petitions and
answers.48 There is also the fear that denial of review will be used as an
45. The rules that accompanied the CAB's Notice of Proposed Rule
Making provided that the petitioner could seek review on the ground that
the finding of material fact was "clearly erroneous." 26 Fed. Reg. 8643 (1001).
An appellate review was thus indicated. But the rules as finally adopted
omitted the word "clearly." (Compare the rules for review of delegated staff
action, note 37 supra.) The Board explained that it was its intention to
broaden the "permissible grounds upon which petitions for discretionary
review -may 'be -filed." 27 Fed. Reg. 854 (1962). The other enumerated grounds
for review would also require de novo consideration.
46. 27 Fed. Reg. 854 (1962).
47. This is the judgment of the Administrative Conference's Committee
on Licenses and Authorizations. S. Doc. No. 24, at 406 n.340.
48. A petition for review in an economic proceeding must be filed within
25 days after the initial decision is served upon the petitioner. It may not
exceed 20 pages in length. The party opposing review must file an answer
within 15 days after the petition for review is served upon it. The answer
may not exceed 15 pages in length, unless it is in reply to two or more peti-
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easy expedient in avoiding decisions on highly controversial matters, or
in succumbing to political pressures favoring the result reached by the
initial decision.49
Taking account of these feelings and fears, the Administrative
Conference approved the recommendation of its Committee on
licenses and Authorizations that the Board should
adopt procedures, supplementary to its recent delegation of decisional
authority to -hearing examiners, which would provide for issuance of
notices of -review in major route cases at the time of the Board's con-
solidation order (or similar procedural step); such notices should make
Board review available, at the option of a disappoilited party, in all
major route cases, while mserving the Board's discretionary authority
to review, or decline to review, other route matters.50
The Committee explained that at the time of the CAB's con-
solidation order or other order issued at the outset of the proceed-
ing, the Board would know the dimensions of the proceeding and
"'be in a position to determine, reasonably accurately, whether it
would be a major or a minor route proceeding " '' The Committee
envisaged the possibility of summary review in major route cases
and certiorari review in minor route cases5 - The fact that a route
case is minor, however, does not obviate the difficulties of certio-
rari review explained above. The Committee itself recognized this
lact when it pointed out that even in minor route matters, "review
-could be granted where important policy issues unexpectedly arose
or where the examiner committed a blatant error .... "53
_ Conclusions as to the nature of the system of review actually
being practiced by the CAB cannot be drawn from a reading of its
orders disposing of petitions for review. During the period from
February 2, 1962, when the Board's rules implementing its re-
organization plan became effective, until October 8, 1903, the date
on which the latest statistics were compiled, 42 initial decisions
subject to discretionary review were rendered by hearing ex-
aminers in economic cases.5 4 Petitions for review were filed in 28
tions for -review, in which case it may not exceed 20 pages in length. CAB
Rules of Practice, 14 CF.R. § 302.28 ,(1963). The Chief Examiner, however,
may ease these limitations if they "prove to he inequitable in a particular
situation." CAB Organization, 14 C.F R. § 302.28 (1963).
49. S. Doc. No. 24, at 406.
50. Administrative Conference Recommendation No. 21(4), S. Doc. No.
-124, at 817-18.
51. S. Doc. No. 24, at 407.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. For these and the following data, I am indebted to Mr. Whitney
Gillilland, CAB Member, who set them forth in a letter dated December 3,
1963.
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cases; in only one of these cases was the petition filed by the
CAB's Bureau of Economic Regulation, which acts as a party
in these proceedings. The Board declined to exercise its right of
review in six cases (including the case in which the Bureau filed
the petition)55 and granted partial review in eight 0 cases and full
review in nine cases.57 Five petitions for review were still pending
on October 8, 1963. The Board also took the initiative to review
four of the 14 cases in which no petitions for review were filed. 8
Where it either declines or undertakes review, in whole or in
part, the Board's order merely announces the fact but states no
reasons for its action. Some of the cases reviewed were decided
summarily (i.e., without further written or oral argument); the
Board announced its decisions in the orders granting review."
To date, judicial review has not been sought in any economic
case in which the Board has declined to review the hearing ex-
aminer's initial decision.
E. DISAPPROVAL OF PLANS FOR SEC, FCC AND NLRB
As Dean Landis has said, the reasons for the disapproval of
55. The six cases are CAB Order E-19116, E-19256, E-19017, E-19745,
E-19759, & E-19907. The petition for review in E-19759 was filed by the
Bureau of Economic Regulation.
56. The eight cases are CAB Order E-18359, E-19138, E-19290, E-19382,
E-19349, E-19359, E-19566, & E-19880.
57. The nine cases are CAB Order E-19128, E-19203, E-19796, E-19821,
E-19938, E-19976, E-20000, E-20011, & E-90035.
58. The four cases are CAB Order E-18324, E-19484, E-19782, &
E-19888.
The situation with respect to safety cases is as follows: From February
2, 1962 until October 8, 1963, 92 initial decisions subject to discretionary re-
view were rendered by hearing examiners in safety cases. Petitions for review
were filed in only 31 of these cases. The Board declined to exercise its right
of review in 17 cases ,(S-1155, S-1157, S-1162, S-1163, S-1164, S-1167,
S-1172, S-1174, S-1176, 5-1178, S-1188, S-1191, S-1194, S-1190, S-1202,
S-1207, & S-1211), granted partial review in three cases (S-1200, S-1203, &
S-1205) and full review in four cases (S-1165, S-1168, S-1170, & S-1181).
Petitions were still -pending in seven cases on October 8, 1963. The Board did
not take the initiative to review any of the 62 cases in which no petitions
for review were filed.
To date, judicial review -has been sought in two safety cases in which the
Board 'has declined to review the hearing examiner's initial decision. In Brown
v. CAB, 824 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1963), affirming S-1176, the Board 'had refused
to review a decision of a hearing examiner suspending a pilot's certificate for
four months; consequently, the decision became the final decision of the
Board. The court affirmed the Board's decision on the ground that there was
substantial evidence to support the crucial findings. In Sabinske, No. 21133,
CAB, Dec. 18, 1963, the Board declined review of a hearing examiner's initial
decision suspending a pilot's certificate for 30 days. The appeal is still pending.
59. See, e.g., CAB Order E-19888, Aug. 8, 1963; CAB Order S-1205,
Aug. 19, 1963.
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the plans affecting the SEC, FCC and NLRB are "various. '0
In the case of the FCC, he charged, "you were dealing with a
concentrated and well-knit industry with enormous propaganda
potentials - an industry that had only recently been riled by the
threat of enforcement of Congressional standards theretofore long
ignored." Dean Landis finds it "difficult to assay" the reasons for
the defeat of the plan affecting the SEC, but attributes it pri-
marily to "opposition more factitious than real from the New
York Stock Exchange, whose position on this point was strongly
supported by the Senior Senator from New York" (The Honor-
able Jacob K. Javits). The failure of the plan for the NLRB is
attributed, by Dean Landis, "to one cause, namely the absence of
any desire on the part of the conservative elements of the Con-
gress to make of the [Labor-Management Relations Act] a work-
able act"'
Indeed, it is difficult to explain why the plans for the FTC,
CAB and FNEC were approved but those for the SEC, FCC and
NLRB were disapproved. A reading of the congressional com-
mittee hearings and debates on the plans reveals that the dis-
approved plans would have had a better chance of approval if
they had been drafted to authorize a mandatory but summary,
appellate system of review of initial decisions, rather than a
certiorari systemY1 Critics of the plans were hesitant to authorize
agencies to delegate to hearing examiners the power to render
final, unreviewed administrative decisions. Once this possibility
was foreclosed or miniried - by a statutory requirement that an
employee board should review on a plenary, de novo, basis every
initial decision which the agency elected not to review or that the
agency itself review specified categories of cases- Congress, as
we shall see, was more disposed to authorize the delegation of the
decision-making function in proceedings governed by sections 7
and 8 of the APA.
F. 1961-1962 STATUTES AUTHORIZING DELEGATION OF
DECISION-MAKING FuNcTIoN
1. By FCC
The congressional attitude described was first reflected in Pub-
lic Law 87-192, which was enacted after Reorganization Plan
60. Address by Dean James M. Landis, Southeast Regional Meeting of
the American Bar Association, Birmingham, Alabama, Nov. 9, 1901. The
,quotations that -follow axe from this address.
61. Hearings: See Hearings Before Senate Committee on Government
Operations on Reorganization Plan Nos. 1-5 of 1961, 87th Aong., lst Sess.
(1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee of House Committee on Government
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No. 2 was disapproved.2 This statute authorizes the FCC to
delegate its function of reviewing the decisions of hearing ex-
aminers in cases of adjudication as defined by the APA to a panel
of commissioners, an individual commissioner, or an employee
Operations on Reorganization Plans Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 1961, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on Reorganization Plans Nos. 1 and 2 (SEC, FCC), 87th Cong.,
let Sess. (1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency on Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1961 (SEC), 87th
Cong., 1st Ses. (1961); Hearings Before Senate Committee on Government
Operations on Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961 (NLRB), 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee of House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations on Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961 (NLRB), 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on
Commerce on Reorganization of CAB, FTC and Federal Maritime Board,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee of House Com-
mittee on Government Operations on Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961
(Maritime Functions), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. ,(1961); Hearings Before House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Reorganization Plan No. 7
of 1961, 87th Cong., lst Ses. (1961).
Reports and debates on Plan No. 1 (SEC): S. REP. No. 393, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 509, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 107 CoNe.
REc. 8025, 10468--71, 10818-19, 10969-70, 10974-79, 10995-11003 (1961).
Reports and debates on Plan No. 2 (FCC): H.R. REP. No. 446, 87th
Cong., 1st Sees. (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 10448-63 (1961).
Reports and debates on Plan No. 3 (CAB): H.R. REP. No. 510, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. REP. No. 477, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1901); 107
CONG. REC. 10839-44, 11741-48 (1961).
Reports and debates on Plan No. 4 (FTC): H.R. REP. No. 511, 87t11
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. REP. No. 478, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1901); 107
CONG. REC. 10844-56, 11721-31, 11735-40 (1961).
Reports and debates on Plan No. 5 .(NLRB): H.R. REP. No. 576, 87th
Cong., lst Sess. (1961); S. REP. No. 571, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 107
CONG. REC. 10223, 12905-32, 13023, 13069-78 (1961).
Reports -and debates on Plan No. 7 (FMC): There were no reports on the
House and Senate resolutions disapproving this plan. For the debates, see 107
CONG. REc. 12746-47, 18018-22, 18084-97, 14658-59, 15446-58, 15460-61
(1961).
62. 75 Stat. 420 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 87-192]. Like
Reorganization Plan No. 2, the new statute abolished the "review staff" called
for by the Communications Act of 1934, § 5(c), 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 155(c) (Supp. IV, 1962). Unlike Plan No. 2, Pub. L. No. 87-192 con-
tains no provision transferring to the FCC Chairman the Commission's functions
with respect to the assignment of Commission personnel, including commis-
sioners. As the Senate Commerce Committee pointed out, however, "section
5(a) of the Communications Act now gives the Chairman broad authority
to coordinate and reorganize the work of the Commission. Your committee
agrees with the Commission that any additional specification of authority,
such as to assign personnel, should be accomplished by Commission rule."
S. REP. No. 576, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 576].
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board consisting of three or more employees0 3 In all other cases,
the FCC is authorized to delegate any of its functions to an indi-
vidual employee as well as to the eligible delegates already named,
except that it may not delegate the function of presiding at a
hearing governed by section 7 of the APA to any person not quali-
fied to do so under that section. 4
In every case of adjudication designated by the Commission for
hearing, any party to the proceeding "shall be permitted ,to file
exceptions and memoranda in support thereof to the initial, tenta-
tive, or recommended'decision," which must be ruled on by the
Commission or its delegate performing the review functionPa The
Pub. L. No. 87-192 also contains provisions modifying pre-existing re-
quirements with respect to the internal separation of functions which, how-
ever, are not of present concern. On Pub. L. No. 87-192, see generally S. REP.
No. 576; H.R. REP. No. 723, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1901); CoN,-. 11w. No.
996, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); 107 CoNG. [Ic. 12717-18, 15492, 15599
(1961); Hearings Before Communications Subcommittee of Senate Committee
on Commerce on Reorganization of the FCC, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1061);
Hearings Before Subcommittee of House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce on FCC Reorganization, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1901).
The Senate Commerce Committee explained that Reorganization Plan
No. 2 was disapproved because (1) it would -have amended substantive pro-
visions of the Communications Act, which it -was thought should -be done by
the legislative process rather than a reorganization plan and (2) it Vould have
concentrated too much power in the FCC Chairman. S. REP. No. 576, at 5.
Interestingly enough, the resulting concentration of more power in the
hands of he Chairmen did not induce Congress to disapprove the reorganiza-
tion plans for the CAB, FTC, and FMC or prevent enactment of the statute,
which will be considered shortly, giving the SEC Chairman the powers he
would -have had under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1961. On the other hand,
the fact that 'the plan for the NLRB did not seek to concentrate power in
the hands of the Chairman did not suffice to save it in the House.
63. Communications Act of 1934, § 5(d)(1), 48 Stat. 1004, as amended, 47
US.C. § 155(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 196-2). The employees serving on such a review
board "shall be in a grade classification or salary level" not less than 'that "of
'the employee or employees whose actions are to -be reviewed." 75 Stat. 420
(1961), 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(8) (Supp. IV, 1962).
64. Communications Act of 1934, § 5(c)(1), 48 Stat. 1008, us amended,
47 U.S.C. § 155(d) (Supp. IV, 1962).
65. Communications Act of 1934, § 409(b), 48 Stat. 1096 -(1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 409 (Supp. IV, 1962). Prior to Pub. L. No. 87-19-, §§
409(a), (b) permitted only the full Commission or a § 11 hearing examiner
to conduct the hearing in every case of adjudication and required the pre-
siding officer or officers to render an initial decision, "except where the hear-
ing officer becomes unavailable to the Commission or where ,the Commission
finds upon -the record that due and timely execution of its functions impera-
tlively and unavoidably require that -the record be certified to the Commis-
sion for initial or final decision."
'Under § 409(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-192, any persons qualified
1964)
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decision of the delegate may be administratively final. Public Law
87-192 does not expressly provide for any kind of Commission
review of the decision of its delegate in such a case, although of
course the Commission may institute any system for review it
deems appropriate.
In all other cases, including cases of adjudication that are not
designated for hearing, any person "aggrieved by any ... order,
decision, report, or action" or the delegate "may file an applica-
tion for review by the Commission," which "the Commission may
grant, in whole or in part, or deny... without specifying any rea-
sons therefor."66
The FCC has provided for the designation of an individual
commissioner or a panel of commissioners to review initial deci-
sions of hearing examiners, but in no case to date has such a desig-
nation been made. 67 The Commission has established a permanent
Review Board composed of three or more employees who will
serve indefinitely on a full-time basis. 8 Unless the Commission
specifies otherwise, the Board will review initial decisions of hear-
ing examiners in specified classes of cases, which exclude the major
matters that come before the Commission,"" and in any other case
to preside at a § 7 hearing under the APA (e.g., a single Commissioner) are
also qualified to preside at a hearing under the Communications Act. The
presiding officer must render an "initial, tentative or recommended decision,
except where such person or persons become unavailable to the Commission
or where the Commission finds upon the record that due and -timely execu-
tion of its functions imperatively and unavoidably require that the record
be certified to the Commission for initial or final decision."
Finally, prior to Pub. L. No. 87-192, § 409(b) provided that in all cases
of adjudication, "the Commission shall permit the filing of exceptions to such
initial decision -by any party to ,the proceeding and shall, upon request, hear
oral argument on such exceptions 'before the entry of any final decision, order,
or requirement." This requirement has been eliminated.
66. Communications Act of 1934, §§ 5(d)(4), (5), 48 Stat. 1068 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 155 (Supp. IV, 1962). Generally, a hearing is required
in a case of adjudication if the Commission decides that the relief sought
should not be granted without a hearing or if adversary parties raise ques-
tions requiring a hearing. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(a)(d), (c) (Supp. IV, 1902).
67. For the delegations of authority by the FCC, see generally 47 C.F.R.
§§ 0.201-.841 (Supp. 1963). The provision mentioned in the text is § 0.218.
I am indebted to Mr. Max Paglin, General Counsel of the FCC, for informa-
tion about the FCC's experience under Pub. L. No. 87-192.
68. 47 C.F R. § 0.206(a), (e) (Supp. 1963).
69. 47 C.F.R. § 0.207 (Supp. 1963). The classes of cases specified are (1)
television translator proceedings; (2) standard AM and FM broadcast pro-
ceedings, except (a) revocation, renewal, cease-and-desist, and forfeiture pro-
ceedings, (b) proceedings which involve § 319(c) of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, and (c) proceedings which involve initial application for
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referred to it by the Commission. 0 In turn, the Board may certify
any matter within its province to the Commission "with a request
that the matter be reviewed by the Commission, if in the Board'sjudgment the matters at issue are of such a nature as to warrant
Commission review of any decision which the Board might other-
wise have made.-"71 The matter will be reviewed by the Commis-
sion if a majority of its members vote to grant the Board's re-
quest." If a majority of its members determine that a matter
pending before the Review Board involves a novel or important
issue of law or policy, the Commission, on its own motion, may
direct that the matter shall be certified to it for decision, but it
will not entertain a petition from a party requesting that it take
such action:7
Whenever the Commission takes a matter otherwise within the
province of the Review Board, it will review the hearing examiner's
initial decision directly and the Review Board will no longer
participate in the case. The Commission has also provided that
any aggrieved person may ask it to review any action of its dele-
gate in a nonhearing matter or any "final decision!' of the Review
Board on review of a hearing examiner's initial decision.74 The
Commission may also institute such review on its own motion.715
To warrant Commission consideration, the application for review
must specify that one or more of the following factors are present
in the case:
(i) The action taken pursuant to delegated authority is in conflict
with statute, regulation, case precedent or established Commission policy.
(ii) T-he action involves a question of law or policy which has not
previously been resolved by the Commission.
(iii) The action involves application of a -precedent or policy which
should be overturned or revised.
construction permit for a class f1-A station on clear channel frequencies; (3)
proceedings on applications of communications common carriers filed under
Title III of the Communications Act; (4) proceedings involving complaints
against communications common carriers for recovery of overcharges;, (5)
safety and special radio services proceedings; and (6) proceedings involving
suspension of operator licenses or permits.
70. 47 C.F.R. § 0.206(a) (Supp. 1963).
71. 47 C.F.R. § 0.206(b) <Supp. 1963).
72. Ibid.
73. 47 C.F.R. § 0206(c) (Supp. 1963).
74. 47 C.F.R. § 1.83(b) (Supp. 1963). See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.81, .87,
.104, .106, .108, .110, .111, .113, .115 & .117 (Supp. 1963). The filing of an
application for review is a condition precedent to judicial review of any dele-
gated action. 47 CKF. § 1.85(k) (Supp. 1963).
75. 47 C.F.R. § 1.86 (Supp. 1963).
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(iv) An erroneous finding as to an important or material question
of fact.
(v) Prejudicial procedural error.76
The Commission "may grant the application for review in
whole or in part, or may deny the application, without specifying
reasons for the action taken. 7 Apparently, this provision is not
intended to institute certiorari review. In a note accompanying
the rule specifying the grounds for an application for review, the
Commission explained:
If the Commission grants an ,application for review of a final deci-
sion of the Review Board, it will, as the usual practice, permit the
parties to file 'briefs and present oral argument. The Commission will
rarely dispose of the merits of a case upon the basis of the application
for review and related proceedings. Thus ... the application for reviow
should be prepared with the understanding that its purpose is not to
obtain a Commission decision on the merits of the issues but rather to
convince the Commission to review those issues. 78
It would seem that the Commission contemplates a summary
review under which it will undertake further review only if the
applicant makes a reasonable showing that one or more of the
specified grounds for review exist in the particular case. Further-
more, the action of the Commission on such review (or its action
denying an application for review, unless taken without any speci-
fication of reasons therefor) may, in turn, be the subject of a
petition for reconsideration, in which, once again, the petitioner
may cite the findings of fact and conclusions of law which he be-
lieves to be erroneous. 79
During the period from August 1, 1962 (the date on which the
Review Board was established) until December 19, 1963, the Re-
view Board issued 36 final decisions. Petitions were filed asking
the Commission to review only 11 of these cases; in no case did the
76. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.85(b)(1), (2) (Supp. 1963). These provisions, it will be
noted, are applicable to delegated actions in nonhearing matters as well as to
decisions by the Review Board, an individual commissioner, or panel of com-
missioners on review of initial decisions.
77. 47 C.F.R. § 1.85(g) (Supp. 1963).
78. 47 C.F.R. § 1.85(b)(4) Note (Supp. 1963). So, applications for review
and oppositions thereto must not exceed 25 double spaced typewritten pages.
79. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.84(b), (d)(1), .85(g) (1963). It will be recalled that
an application for review may be denied without specifying reasons therefor
only in cases other than adjudication.
The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a condition precedent
to judicial review, "except where the person seeking such review was not a
party to the proceeding resulting in the action, or relies on questions of fact
or law upon which the Commission .. . has been afforded no opportunity
to pass." 47 C.F.R. § 1.84(m) (1963).
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Commission undertake review on its own motion. As of December
19, 1963 the Commission denied eight of the petitions for review;
three petitions were still pending. Seven of the eight involved ap-
plications for construction permits; the eighth involved the revo-
cation of a radio station license. In six of the eight cases, the
petition for review was filed by the broadcaster adversely affected;
in one case, the Commission's Broadcast Bureau was the sole
petitioner for review, and in one case, the Broadcast Bureau joined
two private parties in seeking review of a Review Board decision
favoring the broadcasting company which applied for the con-
struction permit.
The Commission denied the eight petitions for review without
specifying any reasons for its action. In only one case did a single
commissioner dissent from its action. From the content of the
dissent, it may be inferred that the Commission did consider the
merits of the Review Board's decision in passing upon the petition
for review. By denying a petition, the Commission, of course,
affirms the final decision of the Review Board summarily.
2. By ICC
No reorganization plan for the ICC was proposed by the Presi-
dent. Nevertheless, Public Law 87-247 was enacted to give the
ICC additional authority to delegate decision-making functions' °
The new law amended section 17(5) of the Interstate Commerce
Act to add:
When deemed by the Commission to be appropriate for the efficient
and orderly conduct of its business, it may authorize duly designated
employee boards to perform, under this paragraph, functions of the
same character as those which may be performed thereunder by duly
designated divisions.8'
80. 75 Stat. 517 (1961).
81. 75 Stat. 517 (1961), 49 U.S.C. § 17(5) (Supp. IV, 1962) [hereinafter
cited as Pub. L. No. 87-247]. On Pub. L. No. 87-247 generally, see H.R. REP.
No. 750, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); S. le. No. 839, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1961); 107 CONG. REc. 14963-71 (1961); 107 CoNG. REC. 17933 (1961).
There are no published hearings on H.R. 8033, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (1901),
the bill which 'became Pub. L. No. 87-247; the bill was reported favorably by
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Senate
Committee on Commerce. The Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on June
12, 1961, on H.R. 6716, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), which was introduced at
the request of -the ICC. H.R. 8033 "evolved from consideration of [HR. 6710]
and the testimony developed." H.R. REP. No. 750, supra at 1. The Surface
Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee held a
hearing on H.R. 803s, at which only the Chairman of the ICC appeared as
a witness. For the Chairman's Statement, see S. REP. No. 839, supra at 9-11.
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The Interstate Commerce Act authorizes the Commission to
divide its 11 members into as many divisions of not less than three
members each as it deems necessary. Any of the Commission's
"work, business, or functions under any provision of law" may
"be assigned or referred to any division, to an individual Com-
missioner, or to a board to be composed of three or more eligible
employees of the Commission," i.e., "examiners, directors or assist-
ant directors of bureaus, chiefs of sections, and attorneys.8 2
If the matter so assigned or referred involves the taking of
testimony at a public hearing, the delegate must recommend an
order and state in writing the reasons therefor. Any interested
party, then, is entitled to file exceptions thereto and the Commis-
sion, or a duly designated division thereof, must "reconsider the
matter either upon the same record or after further hearing, and
such recommended order shall thereupon be stayed or postponed
pending final determination thereof."8 8 The new legislation em-
powers an employee board to perform the review function that,
previously, the Commission, or a division thereof, had to per-
form in these cases.
Whether the function of reviewing recommended orders is
performed by the Commission, a division thereof, or an employee
board, an interested party may apply "for rehearing, reargument,
or reconsideration" and the application may be granted "if suffi-
cient reason therefor be made to appear. 8 4 If the review function
is performed by the Commission or a division thereof, however,
the right to apply for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration
may be confined to "proceedings, or classes of proceedings, in-
volving issues of general transportation importance. 188 (It should
be noted that this second, certiorari review may not be employed
if the initial review function is performed by an employee board.)"
82. 54 Stat. 913-14 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 17(2) (1958).
83. 54 Stat. 915 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 17(5) (1958).
84. 54 Stat. 915 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 17(6) (1958).
85. 54 Stat. 915 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 17(6) (1958).
On January 9, 1961, the ICC issued a rule making all decisions of its
divisions administratively final, "except those involving issues of general trans-
portation importance, those wherein the division reverses, changes, or modi-
fies a prior decision by a hearing officer, and those wherein the initial decision
is made .by a division." 49 C.F.R. § 1.101(a) (2) (1961).
86. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce explained
that since "it is assured that an appeal would lie in every board-decided case
to an appellate division of three Commissioners, or to the entire Commission
in certain cases, the rights of the parties would be fully protected." H.R. RFi,.
No. 750, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961). Similar assurance was given to the
Senate Commerce Committee. S. REP. No. 839, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
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If the application for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration is
granted, the Commission is authorized to reverse or modify the
decision being reviewed if it "is in any respect unjust or un-
warranted."87
The ICC has used Public Law 87-247 to create a Finance Re-
view Board, an Operating Rights Review Board, and a Rates and
Practices Review Board to review the decisions of examiners in-
volving the "taking of testimony at a public hearing or the sub-
mission of evidence by opposing parties in the form of affidavits."ss
The Finance and Rates Boards are authorized to review the deci-
sions of examiners only in the cases or types of cases specified
from time to time by the Chairman of the ICC division respon-
sible for the matters in question. The Operating Rights Review
Board has been authorized to review decisions in all cases within
its general purview, except those which have been specifically
excluded from its jurisdiction by the Commission.89 In addition,
the chairman of the Division retains authority to refer cases or
types of cases within the excluded categories to the Board for
review.
Applications for review of the decisions of the Operating Rights,
Rates and Practices, and Finance Review Boards will be passed
on by Divisions 1, 2, and 3 respectively 0 Such an application
must be "based on an allegation of error on the merits, in whole
87. 54 Stat. 915 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 17(7) (1958).
88. Organization Minutes of the ICC, 27 Fed. Reg. 3813 (1962); 26 Fed.
Reg. 10991 (1961).
89. 28 Fed. Reg. 198 (1963). The exceptions include the following eight
categories of cases:
(1) Those proceedings in which a Commissioner or a member of
the Board has presided at the hearing or has issued a report and rec-
ommended order.
(2) Those proceedings which, after due consideration, are found to
be susceptible to per curiam treatment without issuance of an explana-
tory report.
(8) Those proceedings orally argued before Division 1.
(4) Those proceedings which, after due consideration, are found
to involve broad questions or issues of administrative policy.
(5) Those proceedings involving matters of rule making.
(6) Those proceedings involving investigations instituted by Divi-
sion 1 or the Commission under the provisions of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and related acts.
(7) Those application proceedings involving the fitness of an ap-
plicant seeking a certificate, permit, or broker's license in which evi-
dence is presented by the Bureau of Inquiry and Compliance of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
(8) Formal complaint and answer proceedings.
90. Organization AMinutes of the ICC, 26 Fed. Reg. 10991 (1961).
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or in part" by the Review BoardY1 The "decisions or orders of the
appellate division shall be administratively final and not subject
to review by the Commission. 92 If the appellate division reversed,
changed, or modified the decision of the Review Board, however,
a party to the proceeding adversely affected by the decision of the
appellate division may file a petition for reconsideration by the
same appellate division."'
3. By SEC
On June 22, 1961, the day after Reorganization Plan No. 1
was disapproved by the Senate, S. 2135 was introduced to effectu-
ate the plan's major purposes and yet obviate the principal objec-
tions voiced against it, namely, that it authorized the SEC to
delegate rule making and important adjudicatory functions sub-
ject only to "discretionary" review by the Commission. 4 The bill,
modified in the course of passage, became Public Law 87-592.
, The basic grant of authority in Public Law 87-592 is identical
with that in Plan No. 2, except that the SEC is expressly pre-
cluded from delegating the function of making (a) general rules,
although not rules of particular applicability, and (b) any rule,
regulation, or order pursuant to section 19(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.96 Section 19(b) permits the SEC "to alter
or supplement the rules of an exchange with regard to matters
such as financial responsibility of members, trading in certain
securities during specified periods, and the fixing of reasonable
commission rates. '97
The SEC itself suggested the amendment limiting its authority
to delegate rule making; it sought only authority to delegate the
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. 49 C.F.R. § 1.101(g) (1963).
94. 107 CoNG. REc. 11032 (1961).
95. 76 Stat. 894 (1962), 15 U.S.C. 78d-1 (1958). See generally S. REP. No.
776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (on delegation of SEC functions); H.R. RT,.
No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (authorizing the SEC to delegate cer-
tain functions); 107 CoNG. REC. 18001-03 (1961); 107 CoNG. REc. 14971-5278
(daily ed. Aug. 9, 1962); Hearings Before Howe Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
Section 2 of the new law enlarges the administrative powers and duties
of the SEC Chairman precisely as Reorganization Plan No. 1 would have done.
96. 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1958). This section, like Plan No. 1,
precludes the SEC from delegating the function of conducting hearings subject
to the requirements of § 7(a) of the APA to any persons other than commis-
sioners or hearing examiners.
97. S. Rup. No. 776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), paraphrasing the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1958).
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making of rules of particular applicability that it had considered
to be an adjudicatory function prior to the APA but that might
fall within the APA's definition of rule making. The Commission
explained:
An example of the type of situation we have in mind may be help-
ful. Thus an investment company registered under the [Investment
Company Act of 1940] might apply for an exemption from a provision
of the act which, absent the granting of an exemption by the Commis-
sion, would prevent a particular transaction which the investment
company proposed to enter into. In an on-the-record proceeding the
Commission would determine whether, under the applicable standards
of the act, the particular transaction should be permitted and would
enter an order granting or denying the application for an exemption
accordingly.
The mere statement of the foregoing example demonstrates that it
does not involve rule making in -the ordinary or general sense of that
term. It, nonetheless, might be so classified by reason of the broad defi-
nition of the word "rule" as contained in section 2(c) of the APA
,which includes "the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability" and the definition in that same sec-
tion of "xule maing" to mean "agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule."98
The proposal to preclude the SEC from delegating its function
under section 19(b) of the 1934 act was first made by the New
York Stock Exchange and was not objected to by the Commission,
which stated that it had "no thought of delegating its power to
compel changes in the stock exchange rules and practices." 9
Like Plan No. 2, the new law vests in the Commission "a dis-
cretionary right to review the action" of its delegate, but it differs
from the plan in two important respects. The vote of one Com-
missioner, rather than two, is made sufficient to bring the action
of the delegate before the full Commission for review. And persons
adversely affected by delegated actions falling into the following
categories of cases are entitled to review by the entire Commis-
sion: 100
(i) denial of requests for action pursuant to section 8(a) or 8(c)
of the Securities Act of 1933 or the first sentence of section 12(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;"1
98. S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1961).
99. Id. at 10-15; 11R. REP. No. 21045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
100. 76 Stat. S94 (1962), 15 U.S.C. v8d-1 (Supp. IV, 1962).
101.
Under sections 8(a) and (c) the Commission is empowered to accelerate
the effective date of registration statements and to determine the
effective date of posteffective amendments to registration statements
under which securities are to ,be offered and sold to the public. Under
the first sentence of section 12(d) the registration of a security becomes
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(ii) suspension, denial or revocation of a broker-dealer registra-
tion pursuant to section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;102
(iii) suspension, denial, or withdrawal, of any registration or
suspension or expulsion of a member of a national securities ex-
change pursuant to section 19(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934;103
(iv) suspension of trading on an exchange pursuant to section
19(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The SEC approved the provisions of the new law requiring
mandatory review by the entire Commission of the specified cate-
gories of delegated actions. It pointed out that in the case of a
denial of acceleration, "the right of an aggrieved person to go
directly from delegated action within the Commission to the
Federal courts is largely illusory" because "under section 8(a) if
the Commission does not accelerate effectiveness, a registration
statement becomes effective in 20 days unless stop-order proceed-
ings are meantime instituted by the Commission" and there is no
possibility of getting final court review within the 20 days.0 4 The
Commission did not consider it wise to permit a delegate to take
action that, in practical effect, "might in many instances cause a
renegotiation of financing terms or loss of an underwriting."'105
The Commission explained that the New York Stock Exchange
suggested the other categories for mandatory review that "cover
effective S0 days after the Commission has received certification from
exchange authorities that the security has been approved by the ex-
change or within such shorter period as -the Commission may determine.
S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1961), paraphrasing the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933, §§ 8(a), (c), 48 Stat. 79, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(a), (c)
(1958), and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(d), 48 Stat. 881, 15
U.S.C. § 781(d) (1958).
102.
Section 15(b) sets the standards which a broker-dealer must meet to
become and remain registered; furthermore, it gives the Commission
authority under certain conditions to suspend, deny, or revoke broker-
dealer registrations.
S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1961), paraphrasing the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b), 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1958).
103.
Section 19(a) authorizes the Commission, after meeting certain require-
ments, to take such action if it is necessary or appropriate for the pro-
tection of investors.
S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1961), paraphrasing the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a), 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1958).
104. S. REP. No. 776, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1961).
105. H.R. REP. No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
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for the most part areas in which the Commission contemplates
delegation, if any, only to a limited extent'! 0 6
Pursuant to Public Law 87-592, the SEC has delegated im-
portant functions to the Directors of its Divisions of Corporation
Finance, Corporate Regulation, and Trading and Exchanges and
to its Regional Administrators and Secretary. 0 7 The Commission
has not sought to delegate any additional authority to its hearing
examiners. As was the case prior to Public Law 87-592, the hear-
ing examiner will continue to prepare a recommended decision and
not render an initial decision, and the Commission will give
plenary, de novo consideration to any exceptions taken to the
recommended decision.'08
. The Commission has provided that it may review any determi-
nations of its delegates on its own initiative and has -authorized
any party or intervenor to petition the Commission to review such
determinations only in certain specified categories of cases. °le The
petition for review must contain "a clear and concise statement of
106. Id. at 5.
107. 28 Fed. eg. M853-57 (1963), effective March 2 5, 1963. Among the
matters delegated to the division directors, -the following might be considered
adjidicative: the authority to determine that indenture trustees are qualified
where -hearing is waived, 28 Fed. Reg. 2854 (1963); the authority to pass upon
certain applications and declarations under the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act and the Investment Company Act where no hearing is requested,
28 Fed. Reg. 2855 (1963); and the authority to cancel the registration of
broker-dealers and investment advisers when they are no longer in business,
28 Fed. Reg. 2856 (1963).
108. 17 C.R. §§ 201.16--el (Supp. 1963). During the passage of S.
2135, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), however, the SEC informed Congress that
"looking ahead and taking account of the intervening continued rise in work-
load, we now foresee that at some point -the Commission might consider more
extensive use of initial decisions by hearing examiners." H.R. BREP. No. 2013,
87th Cong., ad Sess. 7-8 (1962).
109. 28 Fed. Reg. 2857 (1963). The specified categories consist of (1) de-
terminations regarding the filing of financial statements in addition to, or in
substitution for, the statements required in certain forms and (2) denial of
applications by brokers and dealers for time extensions for filing certain
reports.
Mr. David Ferber, Associate General Counsel of the SEC, points out that
for the most part the Commission has delegated discretion to grant requested
relief and, therefore, "it would be a rare instance where review by the Com-
mission would be sought and the delegation rules were drafted with the as-
sumption that the enumerated categories in 17 C.F. § 201.27(b) [28 Fed.
Reg. 2857 (1963)] are the only ones where a participant could be adversely
affected." To date, Mr. Ferber adds, the Commission has not been asked to
review any delegated action. Letter From David Ferber, Associate General
Counsel of the SEC, to Carl A. Auerbach, Dec. 123, 1963.
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the issues to be reviewed and the reasons review is appropriate.""'
Presumably, in all other cases the determinations of the delegates
will be final.
While Public Law 87-592 authorizes the Commission to insti-
tute certiorari review of delegated actions in those categories of
cases in which it does not impose mandatory review, it is doubtful
whether the Commission intends to use such a system of review.
In the course of passage of the new law, the SEC expressed con-
cern that the language of section 1(c) of S. 2135,111 which is identi-
cal with the language of section 1(c) of Reorganization Plan
No. 1,12 might be construed to authorize a person adversely
affected by a delegated action that the Commission had not re-
viewed on its own initiative to secure judicial review without
first petitioning for Commission review.' The Commission with-
drew its objection to the language of section 1 (c) only after realiz-
ing that section 10(c) of the APA would preclude such a possi-
bility.1 14
The SEC pointed out that section 10(c) authorized it to provide,
by a rule which also stayed the action taken by the delegate, that
the delegated action shall not be final for purposes of judicial re-
view unless the person adversely affected by it first sought review
by the Commission.' 15 It would seem clear that the Commission
was satisfied by section 10(c) only because that section makes it
110. 28 Fed. Reg. 2857 (1968).
111. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), printed in 107 CoNo. REc. 18001-02
(1961).
112. The language of the section follows:
Should the right to exercise such review be declined, or should no such
review be sought within the time stated in the rules promulgated by
the Commission, then the action of any such division of the Commis-
sion, individual Commissioner, hearing examiner, employee or employee
board, shall, for all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be
deemed the action of the Commission.
H.R. Doc. No. 146, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
113. Hl.R. REP. No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1962).
114. Id. at 7-8. Section 10 (c) of the APA provides:
agency action otherwise final shall be final for the purposes of this
subsection [i.e., shall 'be reviewable judicially] whether or not there has
been presented or determined any application ... for any form of
reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and
provides that the action meanwhile shall be inoperative) for an appeal
to superior agency authority.
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1958).
115. H.R. REP. No. 2045, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962). The Commission
also pointed out that § 12 of the AFA, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011
(1958), provides that no "subsequent legislation shall 'be held to supersede or
modify . . . [the provisions of this] Act except to the extent that ... [such
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possible for the SEC to pass on the merits of any administrative
action that might be subjected to judicial review and thus assure
that it will withstand judicial scrutiny.
III. AUTHORITY TO "LIMIT THE ISSUES" ON APPEAL
FROM OR REVIEW OF INITIAL DECISIONS
UNDER THE APA
A. NEED FOR AuTnonrrY
The agencies empowered to institute certiorari review (the
CAB, FTC, FMC and, to a limited extent, the SEC) may also
resort to a mandatory, summary, appellate system of reviewing
the initial decisions of hearing examiners or to a system of em-
ployee review boards. Providing for these four agencies alone,
however, does not satisfy the need to authorize agencies to give a
greater degree of administrative finality to the initial decisions of
their hearing examiners. Together, these four agencies employed
only 59 of the 505 section 11 hearing examiners on July 20,
1962.116
The remainder of this Article will deal with the question of
the extent to which the following provision of section 8(a) of the
APA authorizes agencies to make initial decisions administratively
final:
On appeal from or review of the initial decisions of such officers
[section 11 hearing examiners or other officers qualified to preside at
hearings under section 7(a) of the APA] the agency shall, except as it
•may limit the issues upon notice or by rule, have all the powers which
it would 'have in making the initial decision.ll7
The legislative history of this section is set forth, in full, in
the Appendix to this Article. Before presenting the conclusions
drawn from its study, it should be recalled that the scope of the
authority of a particular agency to accord administrative finality
to the decisions of its hearing examiners also depends upon its
legislation shall do] so expressly" and that § 1(c) of the new law did not ex-
pressly modify § 10(c) in any way. H.. REPn. No. 2045, op. cit. supra at 8.
Because of the discretionary nature of the authority so far delegated by
the Commission, it has apparently not deemed it necessary to invoke § 10(c)
of the APA.
116. As of July 20, 1962, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare employed 165 § 11 hearing examiners; ICC, 1.8; NLRB, 72; Department
of the Interior, 20; FPC, 18; FCC, 17; Treasury Department, 16; Department
of Agriculture, 5; Post Office Department, 3; AEC, 3; Department of Labor,
2; Department of Justice (Alien Property Division), 1; and FMA, 1. Comm.
on Personnel, U.S. Administrative Conference, Report 9 (1962) (unpublished
report). The CAB employed 21 § 11 hearing examiners; FTC, 22; FMC, 8;
and SEC, 8. Ibid.
117. 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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organic statutes which, in the main, are not considered in this
Article.
B. AUTHORITY To REQUIRE SPECIFICATION OF ISSUES
The legislative history of the APA clearly indicates that sec-
tion 8(a), at the very least, authorizes an agency (1) to require a
party appealing to the agency from a hearing examiner's decision
to specify the alleged errors of the examiner and the portions of
the record allegedly supporting the specifications of error, with
such particularity as the agency may prescribe, and (2) to con-
fine agency review to the specified errors and portions of the
record." 8
C. AUTHORITY To USE Cimmomuu REvIEw
Little in the legislative history indicates that when Congress
granted power to "limit the issues" it intended to authorize cer-
tiorari review. It is true that section 8 of the APA does not ex-
pressly require the agency to review an initial decision whenever
a party to the proceeding appeals from it to the agency. It may
be argued that the agency's obligation in this respect is delineated
only by its organic statute and that the "reasonable opportunity"
to submit exceptions to the initial decision prior to decision upon
agency review, afforded by section 8(b), is guaranteed only if the
organic statute imposes an obligation to review.
Yet, it is a fair inference that the APA did not expressly im-
pose the obligation of agency review when a party appealed from
an initial decision only because it was assumed there would be
agency review in such a situation as a matter of course. The
draftsmen of the APA and its predecessor bills concentrated on
the effort to enhance the role of the hearing examiner by making
his initial decision administratively final, without further admin-
istrative action or consideration, "in the absence of either an appeal
to the agency or review upon motion of the agency." Prior thereto,
agencies were accustomed to subject the decisions of hearing offi-
cers to de novo review as a matter of course, even if no party had
appealed to the agency." 9
There is evidence in the legislative history that the APA drafts-
men took it for granted that there would be agency review if a
party appealed. Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee, explain-
ing that the last clause of section 10(c) of the APA was designed
to implement the provisions of section 8(a), stated:
118. See App. notes 13, 18, 38, 46, & 65 infra and accompanying text. For
an example of agency reliance on § 8(a) to require specification of the issues,
see Veterans Broadcasting Co., 29 F.C.C. 1105 (1960).
119. See 2 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.03, at 15 (1958).
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Pursuant to [section 8(s)] an agency may permit an examiner to make
the initial decision in a case, which becomes the agency's decision in
the absence of an appeal to or review by the agency. If there is such
review or appeal, the examiner's initial decision becomes inoperative
until the agency determines the matter.' 0
The House Judiciary Committee used identical language in com-
menting on the same clause. 21 Explaining the provisions of sec-
tion 8(a), the Attorney General's Manua states: 'Tarties may
appeal from the hearing officer's initial decision to the agency,
which must thereupon itself consider and decide the case."' -
The following sentences from the House Judiciary Committee
Report might be used to argue the contrary:
Agency rules must -prescribe a reasonable time for appeals from initial
examiners' decisions. Where the agency determines to review such a
case, it should, so far as possible, specify the issues of law, fact or
discretion for review with particularity. 2s
Arguably, the use of the phrase "where the agency determines
to review such a case" [an appeal from an initial decision] implies
that the agency may determine not to review such a case. This
argument is not persuasive. It assumes that the House Commit-
tee intended to effectuate a most significant result in a most off-
handed and indirect manner. Other readings of these sentences
are more plausible: (a) "such a case" refers to any initial decision,
whether agency review is occasioned by an appeal or the agency's
initiative, and the sentence in question is intended only to empha-
size the specification-of-issues objective mentioned in the same
sentence; or (b) "such a case" refers only to an initial decision
that the agency takes the initiative to review in the absence of
an appeal and is intended to emphasize the need for specification
in such a case because, presumably, the agency would require a
party appealing to specify the issues it is asking the agency to
decide. From the fact that the House Judiciary Committee com-
pared the agencies' review powers with those of courts under
section 10(e) of the bill,1 4 it is also plausible to infer that it
intended to authorize summary, not certiorari, review, followed
if necessary by appellate review.
120. Legislative History, 79th Congress 1944-1946, Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 213 (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA
Leg. Hist.]. For the text of § 10(c), see -text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
121. Id. at 277.
122. ArT'Y GEN. MAiuAL 83.
123. APA Leg. Hist. 2727-73.
124. Ibid. Section 10(e) of the APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)
(1958), prescribes the scope of judicial review of administrative action.
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D. AUTHORITY To Us E PLE.NARY, DE Novo REVIEW
It is beyond dispute that section 8 of the APA empowers the
agency - on its own motion if necessary - to engage in plenary,
de novo review of the initial decisions of hearing examiners.2 In
reaching its decision on such review, the agency has "all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision."
The Supreme Court has interpreted this last provision of sec-
tion 8(a) of the APA in deciding what weight to give to the find-
ings of the NLRB trial examiner in the Universal Camera case. 20
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained that
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
sought to enhance the status and function of the trial examiner
and, therefore, had recommended:
In general, the relationship upon ,appeal between the hearing commis-
sioner and the agency ought to a considerable extent to be ,that of trial
court to appellate court. Conclusions, interpretations, law and policy
should, of course, be open to full review. On the other hand, on mat-
ters which the hearing commissioner, having heard the evidence and
seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency should be
reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown. 127
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the Committee's
bill did not impose this relationship; its bill "required only that
hearing officers make an initial decision which would become
final in the absence of further agency action, and that agencies
which differed on the facts from their examiners give reasons and
record citations supporting their conclusion."' 28 Even the pro-
posal embodied in the Committee's bill, the Justice added, was
"further moderated" by the APA, which permits "agencies to
use examiners to record testimony but not to evaluate it and
contains the rather obscure provision that an agency which re-
views an examiner's report has 'all the powers which it would
have in making the initial decision.' "129
For its decision in Universal Camera, the Court did not have
to rest upon this "obscure provision"; it relied upon section 10(c)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act.' The Court concluded:
125. See 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 10.03, at 11-18 (1958).
126. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
127. Id. at 494, quoting Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative
Procedure, Final Report, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1941) [here-
inafter cited as Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep.].
128. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494 (1951). The
Justice cited §§ 308(1) & 309(2) of the Committee's bill and pp. 200, 201 of
its report, for which see App. notes 9, 10, & 15 infra and accompanying text.
129. 840 U.S. at 494.
130. The Labor-Management Relations Act, § 10(c), 61 Stat. 147 (1947).
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The responsibility for decision thus placed on the Board is wholly in-
consistent with the notion that it has power to reverse an examiner's
findings only when they are "clearly erroneous." Such a limitation
would make so drastic a departure from prior administrative practice
that explicitness would be required.' 3 '
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the APA, like
the Taft-Hartley Act, does not limit agencies to appellate review
of initial decisions. In FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp.,3 2
the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia because that court had relied on the Second
Circuit decision in Universal Camera on remand after the Su-
preme Court decision for the view that a hearing examiner's
findings based on the demeanor of a witness are not to be over-
ruled by an agency without a "'very substantial preponderance
in the testimony as recorded.' ".13 "We think," said the Court,
"this attitude goes too far. It seems to adopt for examiners of
administrative agencies the 'clearly erroneous' rule of the Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., 52(a), applicable to courts."3 4 Then the Court
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958) provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be
of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in
or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall
state its findings of fact and shall issue ... an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice. . . . If upon
the preponderance of the testimony taken .the Board shall not be of the
opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state
its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said com-
plaint. ... In case the evidence is presented before a member of the
Board, or before an examiner or examiners thereof, such member, or
such examiner or examiners as the case may be, shall issue ... a
proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be
filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days
after service thereof upon such parties .... such recommended order
shall become the order of the Board and -become effective as therein
prescribed.
Although § 10(c) requires the officer presiding at the taking of evidence
to issue "a proposed report, together with a recommended order," his report
and order have the effect of an initial decision under the APA, the "recom-
mended order" may become "the order of the Board" if no exceptions are
taken thereto.
Effective as of September 3, 1963, the Board amended its rules to elim-
inate references to the trial examiner's "intermediate report" and substitute
therefor the trial examiner's "decision." 28 Fed. IReg. 7973 (1963).
131. 340 U.S. at 492.
132. 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
133. Id. at 364. The quotation is from NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp.,
190 F.2d 4,29,430 (2d Cir. 1951).
134. 349 U.S. at 364.
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quoted the paragraph above from Universal Camera interpreting
section 10(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded: "That com-
ment is here applicable. See also § 8 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act."'85
E. AUTHORiTy To UsE APPELLATE REv Ew
Does the power to "limit the issues" include authority to re-
sort to appellate review? The bill proposed by the Attorney
General's Committee expressly authorized, if it did not require,
appellate review.186 The Senate and House Judiciary Committees
intended to carry out the recommendations of the Attorney
General's Committee with respect to the agency-examiner rela-
tionship, except insofar as .they permitted agencies the greater
flexibility of using recommended, as well as initial, decisions.187
The crucial question, then, is whether the failure of the congres-
sional bills and the APA expressly to authorize appellate review,
which the bill proposed by the Attorney General's Committee
did, must be taken to reflect an intent to preclude the agencies
from using it. It is reasonable to answer this question negatively
and to conclude that the grant of power to "limit the issues" was
intended to replace the express grants of authority, contained in
the bill of the Attorney General's Committee, to require the speci-
fication of issues and to use appellate review.
This conclusion may be buttressed, arguably, by pointing to
the fact that the bill as reported by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in November, 1945 extended the agencies' power to limit
the issues to cases "on appeal from" as well as on "review of"
initial decisions. 88 But this argument is very weak. The term
"review" was often used in this and prior bills to describe the
agency's scrutiny of a subordinate's action, whether that scrutiny
was impelled by an appeal of a party to the proceeding or by
the exercise of the agency's initiative. Indeed, the term is so used
in section 8(b) of the May, 1945 draft and the APA as enacted.
Section 8(b) of the APA refers to "agency review of the decision
135. Ibid. The Court did not rest its decision upon any particular pro-
vision of the Communications Act.
A discussion of the weight a reviewing court will give to an examiner's
decision in deciding whether the agency's findings are supported by substan-
tial evidence and the effect this has on the scope of agency review will not
be attempted because it would take us too far from matters of immediate
concern. On these questions, see FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349
U.S. 858 (1955); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 840 U.S. 474 (1951);
2 DAvis, ADMnISTRATVE LAw § 10.04, at 18-26 (1958).
136. See App. notes 8 & 15 infra and accompanying text.
137. See App. notes 29, 62 & 63 infra and accompanying text.
138. See App. note 52 infra and accompanying text.
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of subordinate officers," but it is clear that it means also to cover
an appeal from such a decision, including an initial decision.
Certainly, by not mentioning "appeal," the May, 1945 draft
could not have meant that the agency, on appeal from an initial
decision, would not "have all the powers which it would have in
making the initial decision." Similarly, this omission in the May,
1945 draft could not have meant that the agency, on appeal,
would not have the authority to "limit the issues." It seems that
the addition in the reported bill was not necessary, but was a
contribution to clarity. It is significant that the Senate Judiciary
Committee did not consider it important to comment on this
addition to the bill.
It is significant, too, that the Attorney General expressed the
opinion that section 8(a) authorized, but did not require, appellate
review not only in his Manual on the APA,82 but also in his
memorandum explaining the bill reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which ultimately became the APA.40 His view was
shared by-the House Judiciary Committee.U4l
In the light of this history, the conclusion that the power to
'imit the issues" was intended to authorize agencies, although
not to require them, to employ appellate review of initial deci-
sions can be avoided only by showing that the APA was intended
to impose upon agencies the responsibility for de novo decision
in every case. Yet, the legislative history shows that the Attorney
General's Committee and the Senate and House Judiciary Com-
mittees found it necessary to defend the grant of power to agen-
cies to make de novo judgments in reviewing initial decisions. 42
They did so by pointing out that initial decisions would never-
theless have effect, particularly where factual determinations de-
pended upon the credibility of witnesses. And, of course, the Su-
preme Court gave effect to initial decisions in Universal Camera.
It is not persuasive, therefore, to maintain that Congress did not
intend to confer upon agencies the authority to give initial deci-
sions the weight appellate courts accord the findings of trial courts
139. A Y'Y Gm.T. -UrmxA 84.
140. See App. note 56 infra and accompanying text. The Attorney Gen-
eral here -thought that the agency, in an appropriate case, might review the
initial decision in the same manner that a court reviewed an agency decision.
But in the Manual the Attorney General used the analogy of trial court and
appellate court. A 'y GEN. M -uAL 84.
141. See App. note 65 infra and accompanying text. The Committee com-
pared the agency's power to review initial decisions with the power of courts
under § 10(e) of the bill.
142. See App. notes 15 & 53 infra and accompanying text; APA Leg. list.
972.
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sitting without juries - whenever the agencies deem it appropri-
ate to do so.
F. AUTHORITY To UsE SUMMARY RvTiEw
Whether or not the power to "limit the issues" includes the
power to use appellate review, the conclusion is reasonable that
the APA authorizes summary review to accompany any other
system of review. Indeed, the possibility of summary affirmance
of a decision below may reasonably be said to inhere in the process
of review by a higher authority. Such summary affirmance is con-
sistent even with an agency's obligation to reach independent
conclusions.
It would seem that this is what the Supreme Court held in
NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co. 48 The Court there decided that the
provision in section 11(1) of the Labor Act 44 giving a person
served with a subpoena duces tecum the right to "petition the
Board to revoke" the subpoena and the requirement that "the
Board shall revoke . . . such subpoena if in its opinion" the
statutory conditions are not satisfied, did not prohibit the Board
from adopting rules requiring that (1) the persons to whom sub-
poenas duces tecum are addressed shall move the hearing officer
to revoke them; (2) the hearing officer shall rule on these motions
initially; and (3) the hearing officer's rulings shall not be appealed
directly to the Board (except by its "special permission"), but
shall be considered by the Board when it reviews the entire rec-
ord. The Court explained that the Board was not abdicating its
statutory responsibility to rule on motions to revoke subpoenas
by adopting this procedure. It acknowledged that there was "a
degree of delegation of authority" in the Board's rules, but added:
We are advised that in practice the aggrieved party asks the Board for
leave to appeal, stating the grounds relied upon. The Board in deciding
whether to grant the appeal considers the merits. If no substantial
question has been raised, leave fto appeal is denied. If a substantial
question is presented, leave to appeal is granted. Sometimes when
leave to appeal is granted, action is forthwith taken on the merits, the
ruling of the hearing officer being reversed or modified. Or where an
immediate ruling . . . is not required, the Board defers its ruling until
the entire case is transferred to it in normal course.
While there is delegation here, the ultimate decision on a motion
-to revoke is reserved to the Board not to a subordinate. All that the
Board has delegated is the preliminary ruling on the motion to revoke.
One ho is aggrieved by the ruling of the regional director or hearing
officer can get the Board's ruling. The fact that special permission of
the Board is required for the appeal is not important. Motion for leave
148. 857 U.S. 1 (1958).
144. 61 Stat. 150 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1958).
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to appeal is the method of showing that a substantial question is raised
concerning the validity of the subordinate's ruling. If the Board denies
leave, it -has decided that no substantial question is presented. We think
that no more is required of it under the statutory system embodied
in section 11. No matter 'how strict or stubborn'the statutory require-
ments may be, the law does not "preclude practicable administrative
procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department." See
Morgan v. U.S, 298 US. 468, 481; Eagles v. Samuel$, 329 U.S. S34,
315, 316.Y45
It is clear, too, that the Court does not think that the issuance
and revocation of subpoenas present a special case. "Ultimate
decision on the merits of all the issues coming before the [hearing
officer]," the Court reiterated in Duval Jewelry, "is left to the
Board. That is true of motions to revoke subpoenas duces tecum,
as well as other issues of law and fact. That degree of delegation
seems to us wholly permissible under this statutory system.""0
G. REcOmmmATioNs OF ADMNSTRATI CoN E~ wcCE
The Administrative Conference made the following recom-
mendations:
In order to make more efficient use of the time and energies of
agency members and their staffs, to improve the quality of decision
without sacrificing procedural fairness, and to help eliminate unneces-
sary delay in the administrative process of deciding contested matters:
1. Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act should be amended
to make it clear that:
a. Every agency which is under a statutory duty to promulgate
rules or adjudicate cases on the record after a hearing and does
not either itself preside at the prescribed hearing or require the
entire record to be certified to it for initial decision -
(1) may require the party seelng administrative review of the
initial decision rendered 'by the officer who presided at the hearing
(or by any other officer authorized by law to make it) to specify the
alleged errors in the initial decision and the portions of the record
145. 357 U.S. at 5-7. It should be noted that neither in this case, which
involved a representation proceeding, nor the companion case, Lewis v. INTLRB,
357 U.S. 10 (1958), which involved an unfair labor practice proceeding, did
the Court rely on any provision of the APA for its conclusions. In addition
to the explanation quoted above, the Court in Duval Jewelry also relied on
§§ 5 & 9(c)(1) of the Labor Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88
(1947). 357 US. at 8. For authority to make the revocation procedure ap-
plicable to subpoenas ad testificandum, the Court in Lewis relied on § 6 of
the act. 357 U.S. at 14. Section 11(1) of the act refers only to subpoenas
duces tecum.
It should also be noted how much of the difficulty in Duval Jewelry was
caused by the description of the Board's action, in its own rules, as a denial
of leave to appeal rather than as disposing of an appeal by affirming the
action of the presiding officer summarily.
146. 357 U.S. at 8.
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supporting the allegations of error with such particularity as the
agency may prescribe, and
(2) may confine its administrative review of the initial decision
to the specified errors and portions of the record.
2. Section 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act should be amended
to make it clear that:
a. When a party 'to a proceeding seeks administrative review of an
initial decision rendered by the officer who presided at the hearing
(or by any other officer authorized by law to make it), the agency
may accord administrative finality to the initial decision by denying
the petition for its review, or by summarily affirming the initial
decision, unless the party seeking review makes a reasonable show-
ing (in -the manner prescribed by statute or agency rule, such as
a petition for review or a bill of exceptions), that
(1) a prejudicial procedural error was committed in the conduct
of the proceeding, or
(2) ,the initial decision embodies
(a) a finding or conclusion of material fact which is clearly
erroneous; or
(b) a legal conclusion which is erroneous; or
(c) an exercise of discretion or decision of law or policy
which is important and which the agency should review.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the powers of
delegation of any agency under any other statute or reorganization
plan.
b. The agency's decision to accord or not to accord administra-
tive finality to an initial decision in accordance with recommenda-
tion 2a above shall not be subject ito judicial review. If, 'however,
the initial decision becomes the decision of the agency because the
petition for review of the initial decision is denied or -because the
initial decision is affirmed summarily, such agency decision, of
course, will be subject to judicial review in accordance with the
standards for judicial review of agency decisions established by
law. 147
These recommendations were intended to remove any current
doubts that the APA empowers agencies to exercise the authority
the recommendations would confer and to supersede the provi-
sions of organic statutes governing particular agencies that might
be construed as precluding them from exercising this authority.15
For example, NLRB rules require exceptions taken to the trial ex-
aminer's decision to be set forth with great particularity and au-
thorize the Board to consider only those exceptions taken with the
required degree of specificity. 4' Yet, it seems that Board officials
147. Administrative Conference Recommendation No. 9, S. Doc. No. 24,
at 158-56. See also Administrative Conference of the United States, Com-
mittee on Internal Organization and Procedure, Report in Support of Rec-
ommendation No. 9, S. Doc. No. 24, at 157-63.
148. S. Doc. No. 24, at 158.
149. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 7973 (1963) provides:
Each exception (1) shall set forth specifically the questions of pro-
1964] DELEGATION OF DECISION MAKING 863
read the provisions of section 10(c) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, as amended subsequent to the enactment of the
APA,150 and the "whole record" test imposed by Universal Camera
to preclude them from enforcing these rules and to require com-
plete de novo review of the entire record in every case. Thus, Mr.
Boyd Leedom, then a Board member, explained to a Senate Com-
mittee:
Under the present method [of agency review] it is sufficient that the
parties seeking review take exception to the trial examiner's findings
by referring in broad and conclusionary language to matter being relied
upon to indicate a contrary result. Adequate treatment -of such excep-
tions often calls for a perusal of the entire record, and, especially where
the record is lengthy, this procedure leads to waste of untold hours
and ]ends itself to purposeful delay.; 51
Whether or not the NLRB officials are justified in their views
is not crucial for present purposes. Doubt can be dispelled under
existing law only by litigation that may risk private interests and
public objectives. In seeking to dispel doubt regarding agency
authority to require specificity in exceptions taken to an initial
decision, the Administrative Conference echoed views expressed
more than 20 years ago by the Attorney General's Committee.152
The path of administrative reform is indeed circuitous. But ac-
complishment of even this modest reform will remove unneces-
sary burdens some agencies may think they are forced to carry.
cedure, fact, law, or policy to which exceptions are taken; (2) shall
identify that part of the trial examiner's decision to which objection
is made; (3) shall designate by precise citation of page the portions
of the record relied upon; and (4) shall state the grounds for the ex-
ceptions and shall include the citation of authorities unless set forth
in a supporting brief. Any exception to a ruling, finding, conclusion,
or recommendation which is not specifically urged shall be deemed to
have been waived. Any exception which fails to comply with the fore-
going requirements may .be disregarded.
28 Fed. Reg. 7974 (1963) adds:
Where exception is taken to a factual finding of the trial exam-
iner, the Board, in determining whether the finding is contrary to a
preponderance of the evidence, may limit its consideration to such
portions of the record as are specified in the exceptions, the supporting
brief, and the answering brief.
150. See note 180 supra.
151. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Government Operations oan
Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-03 (1901). See
also Statement of Frank L. McCulloch (NLRB Chairman), id. at 190-97;
Statement of Arnold Ordman (then Chief Counsel to Chairman and now
NLRB General Counsel), id. at 201; S. REP. No. 571, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1961).
152. S. Doc. No. ?A, at 158; Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 52.
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Similarly, NLRB officials have also expressed doubt about
the propriety of their use of a summary, appellate review in light
of the provisions of section 10(c) of the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act, which are read to require a plenary, de novo review.'
The recommendations of the Administrative Conference would
also dispel this doubt.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
To accord greater administrative finality to the initial decisions
of hearing examiners in proceedings subject to the requirements
of sections 7 and 8 of the APA is one way to help achieve Presi-
dent Kennedy's stated objective to relieve agency members "from
the necessity of dealing with many matters of lesser importance
and thus conserve their time for the consideration of major mat-
ters of policy and planning."'154 Unfortunately, there is no com-
pletely satisfactory way of accomplishing this objective.
153. See note 151 supra; 29 C.F.R. § 101.12(a) (1963). There is language
in NLRB v. Stocker Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1950) to nourish the
Board's doubts. But see NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1 (1958);
note 145 supra and accompanying text. In Stocker the court upheld the pro-
cedural regularity of having an examiner who had not heard the case prepare
the decision because the presiding examiner died before he could do so. The
court held this procedure was proper because the "functions and significance"
of the decision were "limited" since, exceptions having been taken to it, the
Board "retains its normal obligation to examine the record and reach its
own independent conclusions." 185 F.2d at 454.
On the particular question it decided, the Stocker case may be a sport.
Professor Davis asserts that it is "out of line with the usual principle" that
"when demeanor of witnesses is a substantial element, deciding without tak-
ing that factor into account is undesirable and may be unfair . . . ." 2 DAVIS,
ADmIISTRATIvE LAw § 11.18, at 113, 115-16 (1958). The fact that the Board
reached its own independent conclusions on the record would not make this
principle inapplicable.
On the question that primarily concerns us, the language in Stocker is
not decisive. Since the Board elected to resort to a plenary, de novo review in
the case, the court was not called upon to decide what is the Board's "normal
obligation." That question would demand an answer only if the Board used
summary, appellate review.
Language similar to that used by the court in Stocker is found in a num-
ber of other cases in which the agency also elected to "reach its own inde-
pendent conclusions." See, for example, the following cases cited in 2 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATVE LAW § 10.03 (Supp. 1963): Hoffman v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d
1, 7 (8th Cir. 1962); N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 968 (1962); NLRB v. WTVJ Inc., 268 F.2d 346,
348 (5th Cir. 1959); Robbins v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 78, 81 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31, 50 (S.D. Ill.
1961), judgment rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
154. This was the language used 'by President Kennedy to justify the
Reorganization Plans of 1961. Address by President Kennedy, Message to
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It seems clear that neither Congress nor the agencies wish to
delegate decision-making functions to subordinate officials if the
decisions of the delegates are to become administratively final
without any kind of review by superior agency authority. Yet
each system of such review has its deficiencies.
Certiorari review of initial decisions is the least satisfactory
system of all. If the agency thereunder concludes not to review
the initial decision because the questions decided by the hearing
examiner are not significant for the development of overall agency
policy, the party adversely affected by the decision is relegated
to the sole remedy of judicial review. This remedy is restricted
by the accepted doctrines governing the scope of judicial review,
although it would be interesting to see whether these doctrines
would survive a widespread practice of certiorari review. Whether
they did or not, certiorari review would shift burdens now as-
sumed by agencies to courts and convert the problem of admin-
istrative delay into one of judicial delay. Nor, in the long run,
will agencies serve the public interest by permitting a decision
of a hearing examiner to become administratively final without
taking steps to assure that the decision will withstand judicial
review. An increasing rate of judicial reversal may shake confi-
dence in the agency and harm its general program.
The use of employee boards to review the decisions of hearing
examiners overcomes many, but not all, of these potential diffi-
culties created by certiorari review. At the least, it assures the
party adversely affected by the examiner's decision that a re-
sponsible group of agency officials will fully consider his objec-
tions to the merits of the decision. Since employee boards are
able to spend full time, if necessary, in performing the review
function, there is every reason to expect that they will examine
records more carefully than will agency members and their per-
sonal staffs. Yet, if the actions of employee boards are subject,
in turn, only to certiorari review, the possibility remains that
the agency may deny review because of the lack of importance
of decisions that they would, after full consideration, disapprove
on the merits and that could not withstand judicial review. On
the other hand, if the merits of all the decisions of employee re-
view boards are reviewed by the agency, even under a summary,
appellate system of review, a three-stage decisional process (hear-
ing examiner-employee review board-agency) may be created that
could aggravate the problem of delay.
Congress (transmitting to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1961 (SEC)),
April 13, 1961, printed in 107 CoNG. RE=. 6771 (1961).
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The use of employee review boards has the added, potential,
psychological disadvantage of diminishing the stature and hurt-
ing the morale of the hearing examiner corps, which prefers to
have its decisions reviewed only by agency members."'s
Mandatory but summary and appellate review, as recom-
mended by the Administrative Conference, would eliminate most
of the objections to certiorari review and the use of employee
review boards. Yet, it would not be without potential drawbacks
of its own. In the first place, it would not ease the burdens of
review imposed upon agency members and their staffs to the
extent possible with certiorari review or the use of employee
review boards. Furthermore, if the burdens it imposed proved to
be heavy, agency members (and their staffs) might be tempted
to transform it into certiorari review by giving only cursory con-
sideration to the merits of cases that lack general importance.
An employee review board would then be preferable.
There has not been sufficient experience with different systems
of agency review of hearing examiners' decisions to eliminate con-
jecture in evaluating their respective advantages and disadvan-
tages. Yet, reflection on the controversies that surrounded the
Reorganization Plans of 1961, the 1961-1962 legislation dis-
cussed above, and the recommendations of the Administrative
Conference points to the need to permit agencies to experiment
with different ways of delegating the decision-making function
and reviewing the decisions of their delegates.
The conclusion that the problems of different agencies are
different and that no single solution is likely to solve them all
is not novel," 6 but it is often ignored. For example, recently pro-
posed legislation seeks to confine all agencies, when reviewing
initial decisions, to the use of appellate review and to exclusive,
limited grounds of review. 5
155. The Federal Trial Examiners Conference opposed the legislation
authorizing the ICC and FCC to use employee review boards. See H.R. REI.
No. 750, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); Hearings Before Communications
Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Commerce on Reorganization of FCC,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-83 (1961).
156. It was stressed once again in the 1962 Comm. ON AGENCY ADJUDICA-
TION, SEC. OF ADm. LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N ANNUAL REPORT 26 (undated
mimeo). (The Report deals with employee review boards.)
157. S. 1734, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). This 'bill provoked Administra-
tive Conference Recommendation No. 9. S. Doc. No. 24, at 155. All the
agency representatives who testified on S. 1734 were unanimous in their oppo-
sition to this aspect of the bill. See Hearings Before Subcommittee on Admin-
istrative Practice and Procedure of Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 17341,
87th Cong., ]st Sess. (1961) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1734). Robert
[V7ol. 48:8918
1964] DELEGATION OF DECISION MAKING 867
To expand the role of the hearing examiner even further, one
of these bills proposes to require an initial decision by the hear-
ing examiner in every case of adjudication or rule making in
which the agency itself does not preside at the hearing s58 This
requirement may be justified in proceedings that call primarily
for the decision of questions of fact involving the credibility of
witnesses or the application of more or less fixed policies to par-
ticular fact situations. Hearing examiners with whom I have dis-
cussed the question maintain that the requirement is justified
even where technical data must be evaluated or questions of law
or policy must be decided. In these situations, they argue that
(a) a hearing examiner's decision will expedite final agency deci-
sion more than even the action of an agency dispensing with such
a decision altogether; and (b) an agency's tentative decision or
a staff-recommended decision serves no function which a hearing
examiner's decision cannot serve.
Point (a) is supported by the argument that even where a
hearing examiner's decision is dispensed with, the agency heads
must rely on personal assistants or agency staff to analyze the
record and expose the issues of fact, law, and policy involved.
This function, it is claimed, can be performed more expeditiously
by the examiner who presided at the hearing. As to point (b), it
is contended that in lieu of an agency's tentative decision or a
staff-recommended decision, the staff should be asked to offer
testimony and argument at the hearing as to the facts and the
legal and policy considerations that it thinks should govern dis-
position of the particular proceeding.
To evaluate these arguments, it is necessary to know (1)
whether the agency is or should be ready, in every case, to pre-
M. Benjamin, testifying as Chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Code
of Federal Administrative Procedure, also opposed this feature of S. 1734. Id.
at 8, 10.
While it is somewhat ambiguous on -the point, S. 1603, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1968), also imposes appellate review and otherwise limits the grounds
of agency review. S. 1663 proposes far-reaching amendments to the APA as
a whole and is presently being considered by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.
158. S. 1734, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). S. 3410, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962), introduced after Recommendation No. 9 was made -public, would also
impose such a requirement, except in cases in which the agency requires the
entire record to be certified to it for decision, in which case no provision for
any intermediate decision seems to have been made. S. 3410 would also give
any party the right to appeal the initial decision, on specified grounds, to an
"'agency appeal board" consisting of "one or more panels each composed of
one or more agency members or one or more hearing examiners" placed on
an "appellate roster" by the Civil Service Commission.
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sent all pertinent legal and policy considerations at the time of
the hearing; (2) what channels of informal communication be-
tween the hearing examiner and agency members and staff are
authorized by law and exist in fact or should be permitted to exist;
and (3) whether it is desirable to require the agency to filter its
views on law or policy through the hands of the hearing exam-
iner. These questions, of course, go to the heart of the internal
process of decision making and beyond the confines of this
Article.
Few would disagree, however, that hearing examiners' deci-
sions do not always reflect current agency thinking on law and
policy. (Some would also contend that procedures to ensure that
they did would threaten the hearing examiner's "independence.")
To the extent that they do not, the decisions will not perform
the function of an agency's tentative decision, or the staff's rec-
ommended decision, either of which affords the parties an oppor-
tunity to get at official agency thinking prior to final agency
decision.
Furthermore, all the arguments outlined above for a hearing
examiner's decision in every case would be satisfied if it took the
form of a recommended decision. Is there any reason why it
should always take the form of an initial decision? If it did, the
hearing examiner's "stature" might rise. Moreover, it is difficult
to see what is gained when an agency has the record certified to
it for initial decision only to ask the hearing examiner to recom-
mend a decision but not to render an initial decision. In practice,
there may be little difference between a hearing examiner's "ini-
tial" decision and his "recommended" decision. The agency is
required by section 8(b) to consider and determine all issues
properly presented to it after an initial or recommended decision
is handed down. Unless some other statute prevents it from do-
ing so, it may provide that it will consider only such objections
to an initial or a recommended decision as are made with the
required degree of specificity. And the agency may, if it so de-
cides, adopt as its final decision, in whole or in part, the findings,
conclusions, and basis therefor stated in a recommended, or an
initial, decision.
S. 1663, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), would amend § 8 of the APA to
require an initial decision by the hearing examiner in every case of adjudica-
tion (but not rule making) in which the agency does not preside at the hear-
ing. S. 1663 would also give any party the right to appeal to an agency appeal
board composed in the same fashion as under S. 3410.
S. 1734 required a hearing examiner's initial decision even in a case in
which the affected parties were willing to waive it in order to expedite mat-
ters, but S. 1668 permits the parties to waive the requirement.
[Vol. 48:825
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It has been argued, however, that use of the initial decision,
rather than the recommended decision, would compel the agency
to give priority to the consideration of all initial decisions -
lest they become final in the absence of an appeal - even though
other matters should have a prior claim upon the attention of
agency members. An agency, of course, could stay the effective
date of an initial decision until it decided whether to permit it
to become administratively final without more ado.
It is difficult to become excited about the question whether
the hearing examiner's decision, when called for by the agency,
should be an initial decision or a recommended decision. How-
ever, agencies wishing to "limit the issues" on appeal from or
review of hearing examiners' decisions will have to see that they
take the form of initial decisions because the APA authority to
do so may be exercised only in connection with "initial" decisions.
Agency members have objected to the proposed requirement
that the hearing examiner should initially decide every case.I
Certainly those who are held responsible for the effectuation of
statutory objectives should be trusted to call for initial decisions
when they think this is the proper course without being deprived
of alternative processes of reaching final decisions that they think
may better accomplish the statutory purpose in particular cases
and be just as fair to the affected parties.
In short, agencies should be permitted to use -and experi-
ment with - any course of decision making and any system of
review of hearing examiners' decisions that they think will culmi-
nate in the fairest and most effective discharge of their statutory
responsibilities in a particular case or classes of cases. But agency
heads should also be held to strict account for the overall per-
formance of their agencies, including the performance of delegated
functions. No appreciable reason should then exist to fear that
agencies will abuse their freedom to experiment.
159. Hearings on, S. 17314, at 213 (Frank L. McCulloch, NLRB Chair-
man), 80 (Alan S. Boyd, CAB Chairman), 118-200, 131-33 (William L. Cary,
SEC Chairman), 160-61 (Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral), 106 (John C. Mason, then FPC General Counsel). Everett Hutchinson,
then ICC Chairman, agreed with these agency officials. Letter From Chairman
Hutchinson to Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, June 20, 1961.
Appendix
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 8(a)
OF THE ADMSNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
A. RECOmmLNDATiONS OF ATTORNEY GENEALu's COMMITTEE
ON ADmNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
1. The Bill Proposed by the Committee
The genesis of the APA may be found in the bill which em-
bodied the recommendations of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee. This bill authorized every agency
to delegate to its responsible members, officers, employees, committees,
or administrative boards, power to manage its internal affairs, to dis-
pose informally of requests, complaints, show-cause orders, or other
moving papers, and to govern matters of preliminary, initial, intermedi-
ate, or ancillary procedure.1
This authority was subject to "such supervision, direction, re-
view or reconsideration as [the agency] may prescribe." The
proposed bill also authorized every multiple-headed agency to
"delegate to one or more of its members, subject to review or re-
consideration by it, the power to decide cases after hearing or
on appeal."2
The proposed bill provided that every case which was required
by law to be adjudicated on the basis of a record made in the
course of a prescribed hearing (and which did not fall within any
of the excepted classes of cases specified in the bill) should be
heard by one or more "hearing commissioners." The hearing com-
missioner was to "find the facts, formulate the conclusions of law,
and enter a decision in the case."4 But the agency could call for
the transmittal of the entire record to it for decision (omitting
the hearing commissioner's decision) in any case in which the
hearing commissioner certified that novel or complex questions
were raised or a private party showed good cause why this should
be done.'
The hearing commissioner's decision was to become the final
decision of the agency, without further proceedings, unless (a) a
1. Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Final Report
of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep.].
2. Section 3(b), printed in Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 193.
3. Section 301, 303(1), printed in Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 195, 198.
4. Section 803(4), printed in Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 199.
5. Section 307(1), (2), printed in Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 200.
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party appealed to the agency or (b) the agency, on its own mo-
tion, decided to review it.' A party appealing from the hearing
commissioner's decision was required to "set forth with particu-
larity each error asserted, and only such questions as are specified
by the appellant's petition for review and such portions of the
record as are specified in the supporting brief need be considered
by the agency ' 7 If the appellant asserted that the hearing com-
missioner's findings of fact were "against the weight of the evi-
dence," the agency might 'mit its consideration of this ground
of appeal to the inquiry whether the portions of the record cited
disclose that the findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence."' But the agency was empowered "to affirm, reverse,
modify, or set aside in whole or in part the decision of the hear-
ing commissioner, or itself to make any finding which in its judg-
ment is proper under the record" ' If, however, its findings dif-
fered materially from those of the hearing commissioner, the
agency was required to explain "the grounds of its determinations,
with appropriate references to the record."' °
2. The Committee's Explanation of Its Bill
The Attorney General's Committee was disturbed by the then-
existing divorce of responsibility for the conduct of the hearing
from responsibility for decision." It sought to alter the status of
the hearing officer from that of a "monitor" to that of an officer
who must "initially" decide the case.' So it proposed the addi-
tion to each agency of officials called "hearing commissioners,"
to be appointed, removed, and paid as the Committee specified1 3
The hearing commissioners were to have "no functions other than
those of presiding at hearings or pre-hearing negotiations and of
initially deciding the cases which fall within the agency's juris-
diction.' 4
The Committee envisaged the following relationship between
hearing commissioner and agency:
The Committee contemplates that [the hearing commissioner's] deci-
sion will serve as the initial adjudication of most cases, and the final
adjudication in many, just as does the decision of a trial court. Ac-
6. Section 808(1), printed in Ate'y Genm. Comm. Rep. 00.
7. Section 309(1), printed in Att' Gen. Comm. Rep. 201.
8. Ibid.
9. Section 309(2), printed in At'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 201.
1O. Ibid.
11. Ait'j Gen. Comm. Rep. 45-46.
12. Id. at 44, 50.
13. Id. at 46-50.
14. Id. at 50.
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cordingly, an integral part of the Committee's recommendations isthat, in the absence of appeal, the decision of the hearing commis-
sioner be final and effective without further action or considerationby the agency. But to preserve uniformity of decision and effective
supervision of an agency's work, the Committee recommends not onlythat the parties, including the agency's trial attorney, be permitted
to appeal, but also that the agency heads may, within the period for
appeal, take up any decision for review upon their own motion.In general, the relationship upon appeal between the hearing com-
missioner and the agency ought to a considerable extent to be that oftrial court to appellate court. Conclusions, interpretations, law andpolicy should, of course, be open to full review. On the other hand,
on matters which -the hearing commissioner, having heard the evidence
and seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency shouldbe reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown. Andin the event that the agency does find facts contrary to 'those foundby the hearing commissioner, the agency's opinion should articulate
with care and particularity the reasons 
-for its departures, not only todisclose the rationale to the courts in case of subsequent review butto assure that the agency will not carelessly disregard the decision of
the hearing commissioner.15
Nevertheless, the Committee made it clear that agencies
"should have the authority, when reviewing a hearing commis-
sioner's determinations, to affirm, reverse, modify (including thepower to make the finding which they deem required by the rec-
ord), or remand for further hearing."'" "At the same time, it
should be open to them to adopt, wholly or partially, the find-ings, conclusions, decision, or order from which appeal has been
taken."17
The Committee thus explained the burden it would impose
upon a party appealing from a hearing commissioner's decision:
The specific grounds of appeal should be required to be stated, sothat the review of a hearing commissioner's decision may be limited
accordingly. Because of differences in the subject matters involved in
cases before -the several agencies, the scope of review should be leftfor later definition by the agencies; but it should be made plain by
statute that where an appeal is based upon allegedly erroneous deter-
minations of fact by the hearing commissioner, the agency may per-
missibly, but is not required to, confine its examination of the recordto the portions cited and may reject that ground of uppeal unlessthose portions disclose that the finding is clearly wrong. In other words,
mere allegations of error without convincing support should not impose
on the agency heads the duty of reading an entire record.
The Committee strongly urges that the -agencies abandon the no-tion that no matter how unspecified or unconvincing the grounds sot
out for appeal, there is yet a duty to reexamine the record minutely
and reach fresh conclusions without reference to the hearing commis-
15. Id. at 51.
16. Id. at 53.
17. Ibid.
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sioner's decision. Agencies should insist upon meaningful content and
exactness in -the appeal from the hearing commissioner's decision and
in the subsequent oral argument -before the agency. Too often, at pres-
ent, exceptions are blanket in character, without reference to pages in
the record and without in any way narrowing the issues. They simply
seek to impose upon the agency the burden of complete reexamination.
Review of the -hearing commissioner's decision should in general and
in the absence of clear error be limited to grounds specified in the
appeal.
If limited as the Committee recommends, the process of review
should rarely involve the heavy burden now assumed by many agen-
cies. If the appeal, the briefs, and the oral argument are prepared with
the care and precision upon which the agencies should insist, even
factual issues may be determined by means of reference to the papers
filed by the -parties and to such portions of the record as may have been
specifically indicated by them. 8
8. Conclusios
It is apparent that the Attorney General's Committee pro-
posed to authorize, but not require, appellate review of the hear-
ing commissioner's decision which, in every case, was to be an
"initial" decision, in the sense the APA uses that term. If an
appellant claimed that the hearing commissioner's findings of fact
were against the weight of the evidence, the Committee author-
ized and expected the agency ordinarily to limit its inquiry to
determining whether these findings were clearly wrong. But the
agency could, if it wished, employ a de novo review and "make
any finding which in its judgment is proper under the record."'9
The Committee contemplated that the agency would review, de
novo, "conclusions, interpretations, law and policy."
In accordance with the Committee's recommendations, the
agency would have been obliged to review a hearing commis-
sioner's decision whenever a party appealed to the agency from
such a decision. But whether the agency could have resorted to
summary review is not expressly considered in the Committee's
bill or in its final report. The bill required the appellant to "set
forth with particularity" each error the hearing commissioner
allegedly committed and authorized the agency to consider only
the errors thus set forth and only such portions of the record
specified by the appellant as supporting his exceptions. There
are intimations in the excerpts from the final report quoted above
that summary review would have accorded with the Commit-
tee's views. Indeed, it is sensible to accompany appellate review,
which the Committee expressly authorized, with summary review.
18. Id. at 51-52.
19. -Proposed Bill § 309(2), printed in Att'V Gen. Comm. Rep. 201.
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B. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY
1. The McCarran-Sumners Bill
The immediate forerunner of the APA was the bill introduced
in January, 1945 by Senator McCarran, then Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and Representative Sumners, then
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.2 0 The bill provided,
with certain specified exceptions, that if an agency was required
by statute to make rules or adjudicate cases on the basis of a
record made in the course of a prescribed hearing, a hearing
"examiner," to be appointed as specified in the bill, was to pre-
side at the hearing.2' Officers qualified to preside at such hearings
were to "initially decide the case," but the agency was empowered
to request certification of the entire record to it for initial deci-
sion.0 In the latter event, such officers would recommend a deci-
sion to the agency. 3 A hearing examiner's initial decision would
become the decision of the agency without further proceedings "in
the absence of either an appeal to the agency or review upon
motion of the agency. 24
So far as agency review of the initial decision was concerned,
the bill provided only that the agency was to consider the excep-
tions thereto and the "supporting reasons for such exceptions"
and to accompany its decision with a statement of "the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons therefor upon all relevant
issues of fact, law, or agency discretion presented. 23
2. The Senate Judiciary Committee Print of May, 1945
After considering the views of the agencies and interested
private organizations and with the aid of representatives of the
Attorney General, the Senate Judiciary Committee published a
revised version of the McCarran-Sumners bill in May, 1945.0
It was this revised draft that first added the following provision
to section 8(a) of the original bill:
20. The bill in the House was numbered H.R. 1208, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945), and in the Senate, S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. ,(1945) [hereinafter cited
as McCarran-Sumners Bill]. The bill is printed in Legislative History, 79th
Congress 1944-1946, Administrative Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 1st Sees. 11, 155-61 (1946) [hereinafter cited 'as APA Leg. HistJ.
21. McCarran-Sumners Bill §§ 2(a), 5(a), 7, printed in APA Leg. Hist.
156-58.
22. McCarran-Sumners Bill § 8, printed in APA Leg. Hist. 159.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. SENATE CoMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT
ON S. 7 (Comm. Print 1945), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 11, 191.
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On review of the initial decisions of such [hearing] officers the
agency shall, except as it may limit the issues upon notice or by rule,
have all -the powers which it would have in maling the initial
decision.2 7
Like the original bill, the revised draft required the agency,
when reviewing an initial decision, to consider the exceptions
thereto and the "supporting reasons for such exceptions" and to
accompany its decision with a statement of "the necessary find-
ings and conclusions, and the basis therefor, upon the material
issues of fact, law or discretion."28
The Senate Judiciary Committee did not explain the signifi-
cance of the power to 'imit the issues upon notice or by rule. '*'
3. Action by House Judiciary Committee
The House Judiciary Committee held hearings during June,
1945 on six House bills dealing with administrative procedure, in
the course of which the Senate Judiciary Committee's revised
draft of May, 1945 was also considered3 0
(a) H.R. 184, introduced by Congressman Celler, was intended
to carry out the recommendations of the majority of the Attor-
27. Rev. McCarran-Sumners Bill § 8(a), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 32. The
revised draft also authorized the agency to require the entire record to be
certified to it for initial decision either "in specific cases or by general rule"
and eliminated the requirement of a recommended decision in cases of rule
making or determining applications for licenses in which the agency instead
issued tentative decisions "as a basis for post-hearing procedure." Ibid.
28. Rev. McCarran-Sumners Bill § 8(b), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 32, 33.
29. Te Committee explained § 8 as follows:
The Attorneq General's Committee recommended that the officer or
officers who presided at the reception of evidence should not merely
make recommendations to the agency in which they serve, but should
go further and make an initial decision binding upon the parties in the
absence of administrative or judicial review (Final Report, pp. 50-53).
This subsection, however, leaves it to the agency to choose either in
the individual case or in all cases whether the officer or officers who
heard the evidence shall actually decide the case or merely make a
recommended decision for the further consideration of the agency.
Such a provision not only allows the agency a discretion to be adapted
to different subjects or cases, but it does not require a sharp break with
current practice. In licensing or rule making, however, the agency may
issue a tentative decision in lieu of either an initial decision or recom-
mended decision by -the officer who presided at the hearings.
APA Leg. Hist. 39-33.
80. APA Leg. Hist. 45-130. Another of these bills was HR. 1203, supra
note 20. The hearings on the bills disclose nothing of interest for present
purposes
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ney General's Committee and was identical with the provisions
of that Committee's bill, outlined above. 81
(b) H.R. 339 and H.R. 1117, identical bills introduced by
Representatives Smith and Cravens respectively, provided that
"Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners," to be appointed as
provided therein, should preside at hearings which by statute had
to precede rule making or adjudication.2 The Commissioners
were to "find all the relevant facts and enter an appropriate
order, award, judgment or other form of determination." Their
determinations were to become final "without further proceed-
ings" in the absence of "either an appeal to the agency (upon
such specification of errors as it may require by general rule) or
review upon the agency's own motion and specification of
issues. 33
Upon appeal to the agency from such determinations,
the highest authority in the agency shall (1) afford the parties due
notice of the specific issues -to be reviewed, (2) provide an adequate op-
portunity for the presentation of briefs, proposed findings and conclu-
sions, and oral argument by the parties, and (3) affirm, reverse, modify,
change, alter, amend, remand, or set aside in whole or in part such
decision .... Such review by the agency shall be confined to mat-
ters of law and administrative discretion 3 4
The bill further provided:
In the decision of any case initially or upon review by the agency,
all hearing, deciding, or reviewing officers shall personally consider
the whole or such parts of the record as are cited by the parties, with
no other aid than that of clerks or assistants who perform no other
duties.3 5
Final decisions of the agency, on review of initial determinations,
were to be accompanied by "a statement of reasons, findings of
fact and conclusions of law upon all relevant issues raised, in-
cluding matters of administrative discretion as well as of law or
fact." 6 "The findings, conclusions, and stated reasons shall en-
31. H.R. 184, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), printed in APA Leg. Hist.
131-39.
32. HR. 339 & H.R. 1117, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 139-55; see H.R. 339, §§ 3(b), 4, 6, printed in APA Leg. IHist. 140-
43, 148-51.
33. H1.R. 339, § 7(b) & H.R. 1117, § 7(b), supra note 32, printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 143, 152.
34. H.R. 339, § 7(c) & H R. 1117, § 7(c), supra note 32, printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 143-44, 152.
85. HR. 339, § 7(d) & H.R. 1117, § 7(d), supra note 32, printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 144, 152.
86. H R. 839, § 7(e) & H.R. 1117, § 7(e), supra note 32, printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 144, 152.
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compass all relevant facts of record and shall themselves be rele-
vant to, and adequate [sic] support, the decision and order or
award entered."37 (It should be noted that the provisions of this
bill were not internally consistent. On the one hand, they con-
fined agency review of the determinations of the Commissioners
to "matters of law and administrative discretion." On the other,
they required the agency reviewing an initial determination to
state its findings of fact on all the relevant issues raised, includ-
ing issues of fact.)I (c) H.R. 1206, introduced by Representative Walter, was in-
tended to carry out the recommendations of the minority of the
Attorney General's Committee 8 Like the majority bill, H.R.
1206 required hearing commissioners to be appointed as provided
therein and to hear cases that the agency was obligated by statute
to adjudicate on the record - with stated exceptions 9 Unless un-
available, the presiding officer, after hearing, was required to "find
all the relevant facts, including conclusions and inferences of fact,
make conclusions of law, and enter an appropriate order, award,
judgment, or other form of decision. '40 The agency could dispense
with the pre~iding offieer's decision and direct that the entire
record be transmitted to it for decision only "on petition of all
the privafe parties therein and for good cause shown.:' 4 It could
not do so, as the majority bill provided, when the presiding offi-
cer certified that a case presented novel or complex questions. In
such case, instead, the agency could give binding instructions to
the presiding officer with respect to the questions of law or policy
he certified.
The agency was to accompany its decision on review of a pre-
siding officer's decision with a statement of the reasons therefor
and with separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of
law upon all points on which the decision rested; but it could
adopt in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and decisions
of the presiding officer.43 In every case, the bill stated, the decid-
ing officers should "personally master such portions of the record
37. Ibid.
38. H.R. 1206, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1200],
printed in APA Leg. Hist. 161-76.
39. 1-R. 1206, § 308(b)(c), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 171-73. Like the
majority bill, H.R. 1206 also authorized the agency to make the delegations
set forth in § 3 of the majority Mill. See H.R. 1206, § 103, printed in APA
Leg. Hist. 162-63; Proposed Bill, § 3, printed in Att'y Gen. Comm. Rep. 193.
40. H.R. 1206, § 308(m), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 174-75.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
1964]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:82
as are cited by the parties, with the aid only of assistants who
performed no other duties," and their "findings and conclusions
shall encompass all relevant facts of record and shall themselves
be relevant to, and shall adequately support, the decision, order
or award entered. 44
Review by the agency of a presiding officer's decision could
be instituted by an appeal to the agency or on the agency's own
motion; in the absence of either, the presiding officer's decision
would become final, without further proceedings.45 "Upon appeal
to the agency from a decision of a presiding officer," the appellant
was required to "set forth separately each error asserted, in de-
tail and with particularity." Only "such questions as are specified
by the appellant's petition for review and such portions of the
record as are specified in the supporting brief need be considered
by the agency."
Where the appellant asserts that the findings of fact made by the
presiding officer are unsupported by evidence, the agency may limit
its review of such ground to the inquiry whether, upon the portions
of the record cited by the parties, the findings made by the presiding
officer are dearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Where an agency on petition or on its own motion reviews the decision
of a presiding officer, it shall with particularity specify the points,
issues, or grounds of such review. Upon the taking of an appeal to it or
upon review by it on its own motion, the agency shall have authority
to affirm, reverse, modify, or set aside in whole or in part -the decision
of the presiding officer, or to remand the case to the presiding officer
for the purpose of receiving further evidence and making further find-
ings and conclusions or for further proceedings. 40
In the main, the conclusions reached above with respect to
the majority bill are applicable to H.R. 1206. The fact that H.R.
1206, unlike the majority bill, did not authorize the agency, when
reviewing the presiding officer's decision, to "itself ...make
any finding which in its judgment is proper under the record ' 4 7
might support an argument that H.R. 1206 did not contemplate
de novo review, but required appellate review. Yet, the bill's
provisions with respect to the content of statements accompany-
ing agency decisions on review, personal mastery of the record
by the reviewers, and the scope of the agency's findings and con-
clusions seem to imply authorization, if not requirement, of a
de novo review. It is significant that the minority of the Attor-
ney General's Committee did not mention this difference between
44. Ibid.
45. H.R. 1206, § 308(n), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 175.
46. H.R. 1206, § 308(o), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 175.
47. See note 9 supra.
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its bill, H.R. 1206, and the majority's bill, but pointed to the
substantial similarity of the two bills in these respects. 8
(d) H.R. 2602, introduced by Representative Gwynne, adds
nothing of importance. 9
4. Report of Senate Judiciary Committee5 0
Section 8 of the bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee in November, 1945 was identical with section 8 of the
enacted APA, except for differences in section 8(b) that are of
no present importance1 This reported bill first contained the full
language of section 8(a) of the APA that we are attempting to
construe
5 2
48. Att' Gen. Comm. Rep. 244.
49. H.R. 2602, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), printed in APA Leg. Hist.
176-83. The bill provided that
unless the officer or officers who presided at the hearing [required by
statute as'a basis for adjudication] also decide the case, they shall pre-
pare and serve upon all parties and deciding officers an intermediate
report of specific recommended findings of fact and conclusions of fact
and law upon all relevant issues presented by the whole record.
MR. 2602, § 9(a), supra, printed in APA Leg. Hist. 183. All deciding officers
were required personally to consider "the whole or such parts of the record as
are cited by the parties" and to accompany their decisions "by a statement
of reasons, findings and conclusions upon all relevant issues of law, fact, or
discretion raised by the parties: Provided, however, That the findings and
conclusions in every case shall encompass all relevant facts of record and shall
themselves be relevant to, and shall adequately -upport, the decision and order
or award entered." H.R. 260-, § 9(c)(d), upra, printed in APA Leg. Hist. 183.
50. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) (on McCarran-Sumners
Bill) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 752], printed in APA Leg. Hist. 185-231.
51. S. R P. No. 752, § 8(b), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 221-22. Section 8(b)
of the reported bill did not contain the following sentence found in the APA:
"The record shall show the ruling upon each such finding, conclusion, or ex-
ception presented"; and (2) it required all decisions to include a statement of
the basis (the APA adds, in the alternative, "the reasons") for the findings and
conclusions upon all the issues presented (the APA adds "on -the record"). Ibid.
52. It will -be relled that .the Senate Judiciary Committee Print of May,
1945, supra note 26, defined the agency's powers on "review of the initial
decisions." The reported bill added "on appeal from or review."
Section 8 of -the reported bill differed -from § 8 of the Ay, 1945 draft in the
following additional respects: (1) it required the officer who presided at the
,hearing or, "in cases not subject to subsection (c) of section 5, any other
officer or officers qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 7" to
"initially decide the case," whereas the May, 1945 draft required and author-
ized any "officer or officers qualified to preside at -hearings pursuant to section
7" to "initially decide" any case; -(9) it authorized the agency, in rule making
or determining applications for initial licenses, to substitute for the presiding
officer's recommended decision either a tentative decision by the agency or a
recommended decision by any of the agency's responsible officers, whereas the
May, 1945 draft specified the agency's tentative decision as the only substitute;
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The Committee report did not explain the scope of the agency's
power to "limit the issues" on appeal from or review of initial deci-
sions. It was careful to point out only that examiners' decisions
would become part of the record and therefore have effect, even
though the agency in reviewing them was empowered to exercise
all the powers it would have if it had made the initial decision.53 In
explaining section 8(b), the Committee report commented that to
afford parties a reasonable opportunity to submit "supporting
reasons" for their exceptions, "briefs on the law and facts must be
received and fully considered by every recommending, deciding, or
reviewing officer." "They must also hear such oral argument as
may be required by law."'54
5. Attorney General's Explanation of Bill Reported by
Senate Judiciary Committee
To his statement that the Justice Department would recom-
mend enactment of the bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, the Attorney General appended a memorandum analyzing
its provisions.5 5 In this memorandum, the Attorney General read
section 8(a) as follows:
The initial decision of the hearing officer, in the absence of appeal
to or review by -the agency, is (or becomes) the decision of the agency.
(8) it authorized the agency to dispense with an intermediate report altogether
in rule making or determining applications for initial licenses when "the agency
finds upon the record that due and timely execution of its functions impera-
tively and unavoidably so requires," whereas the May, 1945 draft authorized no
such dispensation; and (4) its wording of § 8(b) differed in a number of re-
spects, which it is not important to point out, but the full text of § 8(b) in the
May, 1945 draft follows:
Prior to each recommended, initial, tentative decision or decision upon
agency review of the decision of subordinate officers, the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity for the submission of, and the officers partici-
pating in such decision shall consider, (1) proposed findings and con-
clusions where the complexity of the issues so requires, (2) exceptions
to the decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate officers or to
tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting reasons for such excep-
tions or proposed findings or conclusions. All decisions and recom-
mended or tentative decisions shall be a part of the record and include
a statement of (1) the necessary findings and conclusions, and the -basis
therefor, upon the material issues of fact, law, or discretion and (2) the
appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.
APA Leg. Hist. 83.
58. S. REP. No. 752, § 8(a), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 209-10.
54. S. REP. No. 752, § 8(b), printed in APA Leg. Hist. 210.
55. Letter From Attorney General Tom C. Clark to Senator Pat McCarran,
October 19, 1945. The Attorney General's letter to Senator McCarran and the
appendix thereto were printed as Appendix B to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's Report. S. REP. No. 752, printed in APA Leg. Hist. 223-31.
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Upon review the agency may restrict its decision to questions of law,
or to the question of whether the :Endings are supported by substantial
evidence or the weight of evidence, as the nature of the case may be.
On the other hand, it may make entirely new findings either upon the
record or upon new evidence which it -takes. It may remand the mat-
ter to the hearing officer for any appropriate further proceedings.56
The memorandum did not state upon what particular language
of section 8(a) it rested this reading that the subsection author-
ized, but did not require, appellate review of the hearing examiner's
initial decision.
The memorandum paraphrased section 8(b) as follows:
Prior to each recommended, initial, or tentative decision, parties
shall have a timely opportunity to submit proposed findings and con-
clusions, and, prior to each decision upon agency review of either the
decision of subordinate officers or of .the agency's tentative decision,
to submit exceptions to the initial, recommended, or tentative decision,
as the case may be. Subject to -the agency's rules, either the proposed
findings or the exceptions may be oral in form where such mode of
presentation is adequate.57
The bill as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee passed
the Senate on March 12, 1946, without change and without an
adverse vote.5 s
6. Report of House Judiciary Committee"9
The House Judiciary Committee made the changes in section
8 of the bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The
final draft of the bill retained these changes.60
The House Judiciary Committee, as did the Senate Judiciary
Committee,61 explained that its bill "follows generally the views
of good administrative practice as expressed by the whole of" the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, but
that there were differences "in several important respects.' The
only difference mentioned that is of present interest is the provi-
sion "that agencies may choose whether their examiners shall
56. Id. at 229.
57. Ibid.
58. Id. at 344.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 9d Sess. (19443) (on S. 7); APA Leg.
Hist. at 233-91. The bill reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee was in-
troduced as H.R. 4941, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. (1945), by Representative Sum-
ners in December, 1945. 91 CoNG. Rrc. 11785 (1945). A subcommittee headed
by Representative Walter reworked the bill and the revised bill was introduced
by Representative Walter as H.R. 5988, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). 92 CONG.
REc. 3069 (1946). It is this bill which the House Committee reported.
60. APA Leg. Hist. 239. See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
61. APA Leg. Hist. 30-33, 192.
62. Id. at 246.
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make the initial decision or merely recommend a decision, whereas
the Attorney General's Committee made a decision by examiners
mandatory."' 3
The comments of the House Judiciary Committee on section
8 were in most respects similar to those of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 4 and only significant additions made by the House
Committee will be pointed out. Concerning the Section 8(a) sen-
tence that is crucial for present purposes, the House Committee
explained:
In a broad sense the agencies' reviewing powers are to be compared
with that of courts under section 10(e) of the bill. The agency may
adopt in -whole or -part the findings, conclusions, and basis stated
by examiners or other presiding officers. Agency rules must prescribe
a reasonable time for appeals from initial examiners' decisions. Where
the agency determines to review such a case, it should, so far as pos-
sible, specify the issues of law, fact, or discretion for review with
particularity.65
The Attorney General also approved the bill reported by the
House Judiciary Committee, describing the changes made as
"clarifications of the language and intention" of the bill reported
by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 0 Senator McCarran agreed
with this description when he successfully urged the Senate to
accept the House bill, after it had passed the House.
7
7. Congressional Debates""
The debates do not disclose anything of interest for present
purposes.
8. Views Expressed in Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act03
The Attorney General explained the provisions of section 8(a)
as follows:
Where the agency permits a 'hearing officer to make an "initial" deci-
sion, "in the absence of either an appeal to the agency or review upon
motion of the agency within time provided by ,rule, such decision shall
without further proceedings then become the decision of the agency."
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 272-74.
65. Id. at e72-73.
66. Id. at 291. For the House Committee's comments on the changes it
made, see id. at 288 nn.19 & 20.
67. Id. at 406, 422-23.
68. Id. at 295-423, particularly at 322, 324, 366-67.
69. See ATT'Y GEN., MANUAL ON THE AnD1IimSTRATIVE PaocaDuns ACT 81-
87 (1947). Only those excerpts are set forth -above which ,bear upon the subject
of this paper.
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Parties may appeal from the hearing officer's initial decision to the
agency, which must thereupon itself consider and decide the case. Also,
the agency may review the hearing officer's initial decision even though
the parties fail to appeal.... Where the hearing examiner (or other
officer where permitted by the subsection) makes a recommended
aecision, -the agency must always make an "initial" or final decision.
In making its decision, whether following an initial or recommended
decision, the agency is in no way bound by the decision of its subordi-
nate officer; it retains complete freedom of decision -as though it had
'heard the evidence itself. This follows from the fact that a recom-
mended decision is advisory in nature. . . . Similarly the third sen-
tence of section 8(a) provides that "On appeal from or review of the
initial decisions of such [hearing] officers, the agency shall, except as it
may limit the issues upon notice or 'by rule, have all the powers which
it would have in making the initial decision." This is not to say that
hearing examiners' initial or recommended decisions are without effect.
"They become a part of the record [as required by subsection 8(b)]
and are of consequence, for example, to the extent that material facts
in any case depend on the determination of credibility of witnesses as
shown by their demeanor or conduct at the hearing." Sen. Rep. p. 24,
H.R. Rep. p. 38 (Sen. Doe. pp. 210, 272). In such cases, it is apparently
assumed that agencies will ttach considerable weight to the findings
of the examiner who saw and heard the witnesses. However, in cases
where the credibility of witnesses is not a material factor, or cases
where the recommended or initial decision is made by an officer other
than the one who heard the evidence, the -function of such decision
will be, rather, -the sharpening of the issues for subsequent proceedings.
Section 8(a) empowers agencies to limit -the issues upon notice or
by rule" on appeal from or review of the initial decisions of hearing
officers. That is, an agency may limit the issues which it will consider
in such cases by notice in a particular case or by a general rule pub-
lished in the Federal Register. It may restrict its review to questions
of law and policy or, where it alleged that erroneous findings of fact
have been made 'by the 'hearing officer, to determining whether cited
portions of the record disclose that the findings are dearly wrong.
Final Report, p. 51. See also Sen. Rep. p. 43 (Sen. Doe. p. 229).
Where the hearing officer makes a recommended decision, the
agency must itself consider and determine all issues properly presented.
However, it may provide that it will consider only such objections to
its subordinates' decisions (recommended or initial) as are presented
to it as exceptions to such decions . . . It may also require that
exceptions be precise and supported by specific citations to the record.
The agency in reviewing either initial or recommended decisions may
adopt in whole or in part the findings, conclusions, and basis therefor
stated -by the presiding officer. On the other hand, it may make entirely
new findings either upon the record or upon new evidence which it
takes. Also, it may remand the case to the hearing officer for any ap-
propriate further proceedings. Sen. Rep. p. 43, H.R. Rep. pp. 38-9
(Sen. Doe. pp. 229, 27,73).70
70. Id. at 83-85. (Footnotes omitted.)
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In explaining section 8(b), the Attorney General emphasized:
Agencies may require that proposed findings and conclusions and ex-
ceptions be supported by precise citation of the record or legal authori-
ties as the case may be. . . . The opportunity to submit supporting
reasons means that briefs on the law and facts which are filed by
parties in support of their proposed findings and conclusions and excep-
tions must be received and considered. Sen. Rep. p. 24, H.R. Rep. p.
39 (Sen. Doe. pp. 210, 2 73 ).71
71. Id. at 85.
